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Companies find themselves operating into a dynamic and highly competitive environment. As 
a consequence, maintaining or gaining market position requires constant effort. In this context, 
growth becomes an imperative. In this regard, M&A transactions represent strategic tools that 
are in the business agenda also during periods of recession and uncertainty, despite their 
embedded complexity and risk. 
This work explores the M&A activity during downturns and considers the economic scenario 
set by Covid-19 to analyze the short-term effects of the crisis on the Italian M&A activity, 
focusing on a sample of Italian listed companies. The main goal is increasing the understanding 
of M&A role and the related value creation implications during downturns. 
The analysis results show how M&A announcements have a value conserving effect for the 
acquiring company, rather than value creating or destroying. On average small positive 
shareholders abnormal returns have been registered but not statistically significant.  
Companies that have seen their revenues less affected by the crisis have been among the more 
active in the M&A Italian market. Widening the lens, the sectors that have registered more 
activity have been those that have led the change determined by the pandemic (e.g. Healthcare 
and Pharmaceutical) and those whose demand has been less affected by the economic 
conditions (e.g. Public Services). The motivations that have prevailed are those related to 
growth but a connection to the core business has been noticed, stressing how companies in the 




M&A have been part of business for a long time. In recent times, they have been increasingly 
used as strategic tools for growth that enable companies to move forward in the firms’ life 
cycle. The high number and consistent value of deals registered annually are some of the factors 
that make M&A a topic that needs to be further explored both theoretically and empirically. 
Only in 2019, 36.836 deals have been completed worldwide, for a total value of USA$ 3.112 
bn (KPMG, 2020). The relevance of the M&A activity is mirrored by the broad literature and 
research that try to explain the various dimensions of those deals, embedded with risks and 
complexities.  M&A results not only in a new business but also in new cultural and social 
environments each characterized by issues of different nature. As a consequence, a variety of 
business fields and expertises are involved in getting more insights about these transactions. 
Despite literature and empirics are trying to increase the understanding around M&A, there is 
not a universal framework that explains these deals. The complexity that characterizes the 
process is reflected in the lack of a more holistic perspective about this activity. 
Among the most discussed topics, the profitability of M&A transactions and their potential 
value creation effect have attracted great attention. Combining the evidence, it is clear how 
transactions are value creating events for targets that most often record positive average 
abnormal returns. Whereas ambiguous results are registered for the acquiring companies. Both 
positive and negative abnormal returns are recorded, not always confirmed by statistical 
significance. The studies that explore value creation have also yielded several insights about 
the determinants of M&A profitability that contribute to explain what influences the transaction 
success.  A series of critical success factors can help acquirers to better plan, negotiate and 
conclude transactions.  Most often, literature and research have focused on value creation and 
success determinants despite the external conditions in which the deal is performed, particularly 
few researches have been done considering M&A during critical times.  
 
This work wants to try to fill this gap by focusing on M&A activity and its success during the 
Covid-19 pandemic. The objective is to understand how M&A activity is impacted by 
downturns, both considering M&A as business processes and macroeconomic events, with a 
particular focus on value creation. The study takes the acquiring companies’ point of view, as 
M&A success for bidders is still under debate for the contrasting results that dominate empirical 




To fulfil this purpose the work has been organized into four chapters. 
The first chapter lays down the foundation for the work. It presents an overview of the M&A 
activity as a tool in the hands of companies to pursue their strategic objectives. M&A is a 
general term used to identify different forms of financial transactions; the different types of 
business combinations that can take place are discussed. The chapter goes on defining the 
transaction process from the buyer perspective, the complexity embedded in those deals is 
reflected in the steps required to close the transaction. The process is presented distinguishing 
it into the pre-purchase and post-purchase phases (DePamphilis, 2017). Finally, the section 
points out the main motives for mergers and acquisitions taking both a more practical 
perspective and a theoretical explanatory approach. This chapter will enable a deeper 
understanding of the matters treated along the work. 
 
The second chapter explores the broad topic of value creation of M&A activity, considering 
transactions as business events. The M&A success measurement has interested different 
business fields that have treated the topic with the respective perspective. The M&A 
performance construct is defined within the main methods used to measure it. The chapter 
follows in stressing what are the main factors that affect the acquirer performance according to 
the broad literature and empirical studies. The success factors are categorized and presented 
according to three main areas that correspond to the business fields that are embodied in these 
transactions: strategic management, finance, organizational behavior (Weber et al.; 2013). The 
idea is releasing the set of factors that help explain M&A success with a holistic approach that 
combines the perspectives of the various business studies. 
 
The third chapter enters in the core of the analysis. Firstly, the M&A activity is seen as a 
macroeconomic event, impacted by external environment conditions. The main drivers that 
explain the cyclical nature of M&A activity are discussed, making clear how transactions are 
boosted by periods of economic expansion, whereas they tend to be weaker during periods of 
recessions. Despite there is not a direct connection between M&A success and external 
environment, deal activity does not disappear during critical times even if embedded with risk 
and complexity. As a strategic tool in the hands of managers, an M&A transaction is the result 
of a decision-making process inevitably affected by external conditions. As a consequence, the 
section moves on to understand the role of M&A transactions during hard times and to explore 
how value creation is impacted by adverse economic conditions. The chapter ends considering 
the recent Covid-19 outbreak and its consequences on the economic dimension with a focus on 
the Italian situation. The business environment set by the crisis is analyzed within its impact on 
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the M&A activity. The description of the scenario in which firms have to operate and the 
implication on the deal market help to define the framework that characterizes the analysis 
included in the fourth chapter.  
 
The fourth chapter explores the short-term effects of the pandemic on the Italian M&A activity. 
The analysis has been conducted on a sample of Italian listed companies that have engaged in 
an M&A transaction between February 2020 and August 2020. Different aspects of M&A 
activity performed during critical times are explored, to test empirically some conclusion taken 
in the previous chapters.  
Firstly, the value creation implications of M&A activity are analyzed considering the acquiring 
company shareholders’ abnormal returns as a proxy of M&A success. The transactions are 
expected to generate positive abnormal returns for shareholders. Moreover, value creating 
determinants are tested to understand the extent to which those explain success. A second 
analysis wants to test if the prerequisite of financial strength connected to acquiring companies 
that undertake M&A transactions during critical times is confirmed empirically in our sample. 
Both the mentioned analysis will be conducted utilizing a statistical approach.  
The last part of the section moves on exploring two qualitative characteristics of the sample 
under study. The activity registered in the period under analysis is examined looking at the 
different sectors. M&A deals are expected to be on the agenda of the businesses less impacted 
by the crisis and those belonging to non-cyclical sectors. Finally, a brief analysis is made 
looking at the M&A motivations that have pushed companies in our sample to perform M&A 




1. An Overview on M&A Transactions  
 
1.1 Mergers and Acquisitions a Tool for Growth 
 
Growth is fundamental for the survival of the business. Where being small can be an advantage 
working in niche markets, being bigger makes it easier for a company to acquire assets, attract 
talents, fund investments, gain market share and competitive advantage. 
A company can opt for multiple value creating growing paths, ranging from internal growth 
possibilities, called also organic growth, to external opportunities.  The growth opportunities 
spectrum sees on one side development obtained when companies rely only on internal 
resources to expand their business, for example by investing in R&D and training. On the 
opposite side of the spectrum, mergers and acquisitions take place. These transactions lead to 
overcoming the company borders, expanding the business by bringing together assets, 
competencies, human capital of two or more companies. Given the difficulties managers have 
traditionally faced in the pursuit of internal growth (e.g., inadequate innovation management 
processes, ‘new stream-to-mainstream’ business integration difficulties), external growth 
through M&A activity may seem like an easy and obvious solution (King et al., 2004).  
Merger and acquisition is a general term used to identify financial transactions that lead to the 
consolidation of companies or assets. These include mergers, acquisitions, tender offers, asset 
purchases and management acquisitions.  
A merger identifies a combination of two or more companies that generate a new legal entity, 
usually those are of similar size and power, in this case, a merger of equals occurs.  
With acquisitions, a company takes over another business. In this scenario, often a dominating 
company buys a target that ceases to exist and is incorporated by the acquirer. The acquisition 
is partial when only part of the shares or assets are transferred to the acquiring firm.  
A tender offer is a formal proposal to buy shares in another firm made directly to its 
shareholders, usually it results from friendly negotiations between the board of the acquirer and 
the target firm (DePamphilis, 2017).  
When a firm is interested in a particular asset of the target company, an asset purchase may be 
the best solution, when possible. The acquirer selects the target’s assets, avoiding involvement 
in contingent liabilities.  
Finally, management acquisitions occur when a management group acquires a company. If the 
management is internal a management buyout happens, thus former managers become owners 
of the company, whereas a management buy in takes place with the involvement of external 
managers seeking to be the new owners of the target company. 
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Despite the slight difference in meaning attributed to the general M&A term, the ending result 
of the transaction is often the same: two companies that had separate ownership are now 
operating under the same roof, to obtain some strategic or financial objective (Sherman and 
Hart, 2006). 
Although some companies consider those transactions as strategies, M&A are enablers of 
strategies and long-term value (Mckinsey, 2020), thus vehicles for reaching objectives rather 
than the objective itself. As a consequence, a well-defined strategy should always be the starting 
point for undertaking an M&A transaction, which is a complex process that involves a multiple 
set of skills and academic tools (strategy, finance/valuation, marketing, accounting, negotiation, 
etc.) and the joint effort of key professionals (company’s owners, CEO, CFO, management, 
advisor, investment banks, etc.). 
 
1.2 The M&A Process 
 
The M&A process is complex and challenging, involving multiple professionals and requiring 
a wide array of skills. The process can be analyzed from the buyer or seller perspective, this 
work focuses on the acquirer point of view, as a consequence the bidder perspective is taken 
into consideration. Moreover, acquisition steps slightly differ in connection to the buyers’ 
nature for their different goals. Strategic buyers are companies in the same or different industry 
of the target whose primary interest is increasing shareholders value by realizing long-term 
synergies. These differ from financial buyers that are more focused on realizing short to 
medium term financial returns and often finance the acquisition through large amounts of debt. 
The latter category includes private equity firms, venture capital firms, hedge funds, ultra-high 
net worth individuals. 
Here the focus will be on the strategic buyer acquisition process. It has to be stressed that the 
complexity and length of the process depend on the characteristics of the deal, here the 
traditional steps are presented as the state of the art, but discrepancies with real case scenarios 
are possible in connection to the particular needs of the case. Moreover, this work deals with 
the M&A process in a simplified and synthesized way, leaving apart the technicalities that are 
over the scope of the work. 
The M&A process does not simply define the steps toward the closing of the deal, but it is 
important as how it is performed affects the outcome of the transaction (Jemison and Sitkin, 
1986). The pre-purchase decision-making process includes a set of activities that have 
significant consequences for the post-acquisition integration phase and for the deal success 
(Angwin et al., 2004).  
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According to DePamphilis (2017), the process can be distinguished in pre-purchase decision 
activities and post-purchase decision activities. The M&A process is summarized in figure 1. 
The first element to consider in the pre-purchase phase is the correspondence between the 
corporate strategy and the transaction objectives. The M&A deal should always support the 
corporate strategy and contribute to achieving the related goals (Uhlaner and West, 2008). 
Hence, the strategic rationale of the deal should relate to the strategic direction of the other 
activities performed by the company. Therefore, to be successful M&A has to be based on an 
analysis of where the company is and where it wants to be in the future, understanding if 
effectively the M&A transaction is the right growing path to follow. In this regard, the strategic 
planning phase should be the common denominator of every new growing path’s decision-
making process made by a company. 
In the strategic planning phase of the deal, a business plan should be constituted within all the 
elements that characterize it, such as business vision, mission, strategy, and connected goals 
and objectives. An internal and external analysis should be performed to fully understand the 
starting point of the business and what it is missing to achieve its goals; in this way enabling 
the company to choose the right option for implementing the business strategy. If an acquisition 
is the chosen vehicle, an acquisition plan that clearly defines the buyer objectives should be 
developed. One of the key goals of the acquisition plan is to determine the characteristics of an 
ideal target and set the criteria used to evaluate multiple potential counterparties (DePamphilis, 
2017). The benefits of having a well-prepared acquisition plan are diverse, it provides a 
roadmap to follow, it informs shareholders of key company objectives, it is useful to keep 
monitoring the process and to better define long term objectives. A well-prepared acquisition 
plan can be a valuable negotiation tool also when dealing with sellers concerned with the value 
and continued growth of the target after the acquisition (Sherman and Hart, 2006). 
Once a deep analysis has been performed and M&A have been chosen as a tool for 
implementing the business plan and deploying the corporate strategy the M&A process begins. 
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Figure 1: The M&A Process. Own Elaboration based on DePamphilis (2017) 
 
1.2.1 Pre-Purchase Phase 
 
Overcoming the strategic planning stage, the first activity to be performed is the target scouting 
and screening. Starting from a broad list of potential targets, selected based on general elements 
such as industry and size, the acquiring company uses the more stringent set of criteria (e.g. 
market segment, product line, profitability, market share, degree of leverage, cultural 
compatibility) defined in the acquisition plan to obtain a narrower a list. It will be composed of 
those candidates with the best strategic fit. Clearer is the starting point strategy, easier will be 
the target selection. This is true also in the approaching phase when a firm with a clear vision 
about the acquisition increases the chances to close a successful deal (DePamphilis, 2017). An 
approaching strategy is then defined to have the first contact with the target, it depends on the 
target size, whether the target is a private or public company, and the acquirer’s timeframe to 
complete the transaction.  
Once the buyer has approached the potential targets, the negotiation and deal structure phases 
start. At this stage different models are applied to understand the value of the companies’ 
combination, a first purchase price is estimated, and the M&A teamwork is engaged in defining 
the structure of the deal and the potential sources of capital. These M&A initial phases are 
characterized by the signing of legal documents that regulate the relationship between the 
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parties, such as the Confidentiality Agreement, the Term Sheet, and the Letter of Intent (LOI). 
The Confidentiality Agreement protects the parties from disclosing sensitive information. 
Whereas, the term sheet and LOI are very similar documents, usually not binding that states the 
general terms of the deal. The main difference between these two documents is that the term 
sheet is less formal than the letter of intent. These documents are sent by the acquiring company 
after having performed a pre-due diligence phase, during which a first analysis of the overall 
business is performed, and a potential valuation is defined within an initial identification of the 
major sources of synergies.   
The next step of the process is performing Due Diligence. It is a fundamental activity during 
the pre-purchase phase, approaching the completion of the deal. It is the investigation and 
review process regarding the target, to identify and assess possible risks and liabilities, other 
than exploring the expected acquisition synergies. It consists of three primary reviews: strategic 
and operational due diligence, financial review, and legal due diligence (DePamphilis, 2017). 
The analysis can also take additional perspective in connection to the specificity of the case 
such as environmental, real estate, human resources, tax due diligence. In performing this 
important task, the acquiring company relies on professionals in the various sectors that can be 
internal or external to the company. It is a delicate, costly, and time-consuming phase for the 
acquirer firm, that through the commitment of operating due diligence manifests the real 
intention of proceeding with the deal. 
Research suggests that ignorance about potential problems that may arise within an acquisition 
is one of the most common sources of failure in M&A (e.g. Sirower, 1997; Millman and Gray, 
2000).  But the importance of due diligence relies not only on the potential identification of 
risks but also on the possibility to perform a thorough business and financial analysis. In fact, 
in this phase, the target company makes available all the information and data relevant to the 
transaction, not usually publicly available. Due Diligence is usually performed through a 
physical or on-line data room, set up to make sure that all financial, commercial, and legal 
information is disclosed in a way that enables the acquirer to make the final offer based on all 
relevant aspects of the target business.  Due diligence enables the acquirer to fully assess the 
potential synergies and to detect useful information for the final valuation of the target and the 
definition of the final price. Moreover, the insights gathered during this process are fundamental 
to develop the acquisition business plan, integration plan, and final agreement. As a 
consequence, the failure to do an exhaustive due diligence can be disastrous (DePamphilis, 
2017). 
The signing and closing steps define the conclusion of the deal. The closing depends also on 
third parties: the transaction has to comply with securities, antitrust, and state government law. 
 14 
As a consequence, signing and closing can occur at different times. In this phase a fundamental 
document is the Share Purchase Agreement, not mandatory for the effectiveness of the deal and 
the transfer of shares, but relevant for the protection of the acquirer in case of liabilities and 
discrepancies between the post-deal acquired business and what has been stated by the seller 
during the negotiation phase.  
 
1.2.2. Post-Purchase Phase  
 
The post-purchase phase is dominated by the post-merger integration. The deal closing is just 
the beginning of the transaction, a large part of the value creation potential is retained in this 
phase (Sthal and Vogit, 2008; Zollo and Singh, 2004). One major reason for unsuccessful M&A 
is connected to the treatment of post-merger integration as a mechanical process (BCG, 2019). 
As a consequence, this phase does not begin with the closing but should be based on a 
predefined plan elaborated during due diligence. The strategic and tactic choices taken in the 
previous phases should constitute the starting point on which to base the post-integration effort. 
This enables the identification and prioritization of critical actions needed to combine the two 
businesses. Only a plan can ensure process speed and efficiency, key elements for a successful 
transaction (Bauer and Matzler, 2013). A faster integration enables the company to minimize 
the time spent in a suboptimal phase and take advantage of the momentum in the early 
enthusiasm phase of the deal (Angwin, 2004).  Moreover, protracting the integration process 
often reduces the ability of the acquirer to recover the premium paid for the target firm.  
This step is challenging due to risks connected to employee retention and cultural fit but is 
fundamental for the realization of the planned synergies through resources redeployment and 
exploitation (King et al.,2004). 
Finally, a post-closing evaluation is suggested to determine if the deal is meeting the 
expectations and take corrective actions otherwise. Evaluating the positive and negative aspects 




1.3 The Rationale and Motives Behind M&A Transactions  
 
M&A has a fundamental role in the business development and in the definition of an industry. 
These deals are pursued by companies for several reasons and the complexity of the deal is 
reflected in the rationale that characterizes a transaction. As a consequence, typically behind an 
M&A transaction there is a combined pattern of motives, one single approach unlike fully 
explains the reasons behind a deal (e.g. Steiner, 1975; Ravenscraft and Scherer, 1987). The 
strategic buyer perspective is again taken into consideration; thus the following motives focus 
on reasons behind the acquirer’s rationale of the deal. Mergers and acquisitions decisions 
should be based on a thorough analysis of costs, benefits and risks behind these transactions 
and on what the most suitable solution is in relation to the company’s needs and strategic 
objectives. Generally speaking, the decisions taken should contribute to the company and 
shareholders value creation.  
 
1.3.1 The Fundamental Motives: Growth and Synergy Creation 
 
Gaughan (2017) identifies growth and synergies as the two most fundamental motives for 
M&A, which should contribute to the acquirer’s value creation. 
Growing through M&A is a faster solution than organic growth, as it enables the company to 
quickly react to market changes and take advantage over competitors, exploiting opportunities 
that may rapidly disappear. Examples that fit this motive are the case in which a company needs 
to quickly get a new competence or technology, or when it wants to expand into a new 
geographic region both nationally and internationally. Despite growth might be the lifeblood of 
a business, it is not always the most suitable way to create value for shareholders (Cao, Jiang 
and Koller, 2006). Revenue growth does not create value if it does not create profits, and even 
if profits are generated, if it is less than the cost of capital there is a chance that such growth 
will actually destroy value, rather than create it. The combination of growth and return on 
invested capital (ROIC), relative to its cost, and their sustainability are the elements that drive 
value creation (Koller et al.; 2015). This consideration makes clear that the value creation is not 
directly proportional to growth, but other elements should be taken into consideration when 
seeking value creation through growth, such as ROIC and cost of capital.  
The second most cited motive for mergers and acquisitions is the creation of synergies. Synergy 
value is created when, with the integration of the target company in the acquirer, the value of 
the combined enterprises exceeds the sum of the values of the two individual firms 
(DePamphilis, 2017).  
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The equation that expresses the synergistic potential value is:  
'V=Va+t -(Va+Vt) 
Where Va and Vt are respectively the acquirer and the target stand-alone values. The synergy 
value has to be higher than the premium paid for the acquisition and the expenses of the 
transaction to generate Net Acquisition Value (Gaughan, 2017). As a consequence, only when 
the sum of premium paid and the cost of the transaction is lower than the synergy value an 
acquisition is justified. Contrarily, when this does not occur the acquirer faces the risk of 
overpayment that undermines the value creation potential and the success of the transaction. 
Thus, the synergies’ valuation is fundamental for the determination of the price.  
Synergies in literature are often categorized into two groups (e.g. Gaughan, 2017; Damodaran, 
2005; DePamphilis, 2017) operating synergies and financial synergies. 
Operating synergies can come from revenues enhancements and/ or cost savings. Damodaran 
(2005) further categorizes this class into four types:  
1. Economies of Scale that allow the combined firm to become more cost-efficient, thus 
profitable. This possibility is more common in the case of companies operating in the 
same business. 
2. Greater pricing power in connection to the increased market share and the reduced 
competition after the M&A transaction. Whether this is achievable largely depends on 
the degree of competition in the market and the size of the merger partner (Gaugham, 
2018). 
3. Combination of different functional strengths, in this case diverse skills and knowledge 
can be quickly embodied in the acquiring company. Important is also considering the 
complementarity among those and the connected potential of having both under the 
same roof. 
4. Higher growth in new or existing markets, as mentioned M&A transactions are vehicles 
to quickly enter new markets that may be characterized by a faster growth rate.  
All the above-mentioned situations contribute to a potential cost reduction and/or incremental 
revenue in the newly combined firm. 
The second macro category is constituted by financial synergies. Those are connected to the 
improved efficiency of financing activities, which refers mostly to the impact of the transaction 
on the cost of capital of the post-transaction firm. Other benefits included in this category are 
connected to the cash flow. The combination of the two companies’ cash flow may reduce its 
variability when the two streams are not perfectly correlated. Moreover, the excess cash 
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generation of one company, coupled with new investment opportunities following the M&A 
transaction, can lead to greater value creation for the combined firm. Debt capacity increase is 
another benefit that may follow the transaction. This occurs because after the merger the 
companies’ cash flows may become steadier and more predictable, as a consequence the 
company will be able to borrow more than the two separate entities could have borrowed before 
the transaction. Finally, also tax benefits are achievable by making better use of tax deductions 
and credits, or by taking advantage of tax laws to write up the target company assets 
(Damodaran, 2005).  
It is clear that a company may benefit from different synergies after the transaction that 
contribute to value creation. As a consequence, it is fundamental for the acquiring firm to assess 
at best their value. The estimation should first consider the value of the companies as stand-
alone and then that of the combined entity, focusing on the synergy potential that goes beyond 
and is distinct from the value of control.  The latter is connected mostly to the improvements in 




Diversification is another motive that explains M&A transactions. When a firm faces slower 
growth in its market or in connection to its product line, it may opt for expanding through a 
new product line or new target market with higher growth prospects. The firm primary 
diversification options involve approaching a new market or diversify its offer; opting in this 
way for a related diversification. When a company chooses to approach both a new market, 
offering a new product, unrelated diversification strategy occurs. M&A transactions can be 
means for pursuing diversification strategies that occur when the company grows outside its 
current business.  
Companies that operate in several different unrelated businesses are called conglomerates. The 
motive of diversification has characterized the Conglomerate Era (1965-1969), however this 
period has been followed by deconglomeration that raised doubts about the value creation 
potential of diversifications (Gaugham, 2018).  
The diversification strategy value creation potential has been a controversial topic in finance 
for the considerable evidence that acquisitions resulting in unrelated diversification fail to meet 
expectations, resulting in lower financial returns at announcement compared to non-
diversifying acquisitions (Akbulut and Matsusaka, 2010). Moreover, often the conglomerate 
shares are traded at a discounted price than the shares of the more focused firms in the same 
industry, this markdown is called conglomerate or diversification discount (Khorana et al., 
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2011; Ammann et al., 2011). Despite the market seems to not positively react to this strategy, 
this discount is not always true. In countries with limited capital market access, diversified 
companies may outperform as they can use the cash flow obtained in the more mature business 
to fund those with higher growth potential (Fauver et al., 2003).  
 
1.3.3 A More Theoretical Standpoint 
 
In practice, the above-mentioned motives wrap up the main rationales that unfold the decision 
of performing an M&A transaction. However, with a more theoretical perspective, the 
motivation behind the transaction can fall under multiple theories. Trautwein (1990) 
distinguishes seven different theories of merger motives that shift from those that see the merger 
consequences as the moving cause of the transaction itself and those that do not and have a 
more macroeconomic perspective (Figure 2). Despite this work is not current, most of the 
proposed theories are still cited as effective acquisitions’ motives. Thus, the classification 




Figure 2: Modelled based on Trautwein (1990) 
According to the author, M&A can be seen first of all as a rational choice aimed to benefit 
either acquirer’s shareholders or the management. In this first group, five theories are 
distinguishable according to the motive that underlines the transaction.  
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The achievement of synergies to obtain gains leads to the Efficiency theory. Efficiency-oriented 
explanations assume that managers are motivated by the desire to increase efficiency.  
Efficiency gains through the exploitation of synergies lead to value creation. This theory is 
strongly related to what has been discussed in the previous paragraph, it is one of the most used 
explanations for corporate M&A (e.g. Porter, 1987; Trautwein, 1990; Gaughan, 2017; 
Demoderan, 2005). Scholars often emphasize the potential value increase in connection to the 
synergy’s realization.  
According to the Monopoly theory the motive that drives M&A is gaining market power. The 
idea at the basis of this theory is that having fewer firms in an industry increases the firms’ 
pricing power (Haleblian et al., 2009). This possibility occurs most often in horizontal 
acquisitions, where companies operate in the same industry. However, also in conglomerate 
acquisition market power is achievable through cross-subsidization of products, by 
simultaneously limiting competition in more than one market and deterring potential entrants 
from the market (Trautwein, 1990).  There is evidence that increased industry concentration 
forces suppliers to lower their selling price (Bhattacharyya and Nain, 2011). The advantages 
connected to the achievement of market power have been pointed out also as collusive synergies 
(Chatterjee, 1986) or competitor interrelationships (Porter, 1985). The effects of those synergies 
are beneficial as those commented in the previous theory, but they do not represent efficiency 
gains but rather a transfer of wealth from customers.  
If wealth is transferred from the shareholders of the company Raider theory takes place. 
According to Holderness and Sheehan (1985) a raider is a person who causes wealth transfer 
from shareholders of the target company while bidding on the company’s stock. These wealth 
transfers include greenmailing or excessive compensation after a successful takeover 
(Trautwein, 1990). Greenmailing refers to the payment of a premium share price by a takeover 
target to a hostile buyer for the buyer‘s accumulated share in the target (Bruner, 2004). 
However, this theory has been criticized to be illogical (e.g Trautwein, 1990; Jensen, 1984). 
Research finds that the rest of the shareholders are poorer after greenmail as usually this practice 
leads to a significant transfer of wealth from public shareholders to a more powerful raider 
(Bruner, 2004). Thus, the question to ask in case of greenmailing is why the board made the 
payment in the first place, there is no reason why the management would be justified in paying 
greenmail. By the way, this theory is not widely supported by evidence as a major motive that 
leads to M&A transactions (e.g. Holderness and Sheehan, 1985). 
The Valuation theory is based on the fact that benefits are obtainable by having extra 
information about the target company, thus the management of the acquiring company can 
develop a better valuation of the target than the market. This situation can occur in cases of well 
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assessing the advantages that the companies together can exploit. Another source of gain is 
target undervaluation; in this scenario the acquirer has been able to buy-cheap for then fully 
exploit the company potential. This may occur in management acquisitions, where the acquirers 
are the firm’s managers who have bases for developing their target valuation. The target 
undervaluation may also occur in absence of full information when investors incorrectly value 
a firm (Edmans et al., 2012). This situation leads to opportunities of buying targets for prices 
below their actual value or buying using overvalued equity, as long as the target is less 
overvalued than the bidding firm stocks (Ang and Cheng, 2006; Dong et al., 2006). 
The traditional motives connected to M&A relates to value creation, however a substantial 
amount of studies suggest how acquisitions may destroy value when managers act to maximize 
their own utility in planning and executing a deal.  This situation is reflected in the Empire-
building theory. The conflict of goals between managers and shareholders is explored in the 
literature by the agency theory. An agency relationship is defined as one in which one or more 
persons (principal) engages another person (the agent) to perform some services on their behalf, 
which involves delegating some decision-making authority to the agent (Hill and Jones, 1992). 
In the shareholder-management relationship, the management (agent) is supposed to act on the 
interest of the shareholders (principal) also through an appropriate compensation plan. 
However, not always the interests of the parties are aligned.  Focusing on M&A transactions 
managers may aim to increase the firm size when they are rewarded financially in connection 
to it (Masulis et al., 2007). Another management motivation may be connected to power and 
prestige connected to the increased company size (Yim, 2013), both drivers may undermine the 
shareholder value creation if the deal does not have a more fundamental rationale. 
The last two theories step away from the traditional motives attributed to mergers; either those 
that are value creating pursuing efficiency or market power; and those more prone to destroy 
value when managers act for maximizing their own utility. The M&A activity is no longer 
considered a rational choice, but as the outcome of processes or as a consequence of external 
events and conditions that lead to those transactions. 
Process theory has roots in the literature of strategic decision processes where strategic 
decisions are not rational choices but the outcome of processes (Trautwein, 1990).  
Developing the process perspective, Jemison and Sitkin (1986) argue that the acquisition 
process itself has a crucial role in determining acquisition activities and outcomes. In line with 
this perspective better transaction outcomes have been connected to characteristics of the 
process used to make and implement acquisition decisions (Pablo et al.; 1996). This perspective 
has obtained great attention for the importance of post-acquisition integration for value creation 
(Hitt et al.,1998).  
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The last theory proposed considers M&A as a macroeconomic phenomenon. According to 
Gort’s (1969) theory merger waves that have characterized the last century are caused by 
economic disturbances. These forces generate a change of expectations that leads to 
discrepancy in valuation; when asset value for a potential new owner is higher than that of the 
actual owner a merger possibility rises. According to this theory, discrepancies are decisive in 
determining variation in mergers rates over time and among industries. Discrepancies are 
economic shocks, such as changes in technology and movement in security prices that lead to 
a high degree of uncertainty (Gort, 1986). This theory has been explored also by more recent 
studies (e.g. Harford, 2005) that explain the clustering of M&A in waves as the result of 
technological, regulatory, economic shocks that generate an asset reallocation through mergers 
and acquisitions.  
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2. M&A Value Creation  
 
 
Mergers and Acquisitions is a topic of study involving different business fields: from strategic 
management to corporate finance and organizational behavior. This broad literature enables to 
analyze and underline different important aspects but often lacks giving a comprehensive view 
of the topic.  
Also concerning the value creation capacity of those deals and its measurement, the existent 
literature takes different perspectives-in connection to the field of study-, uses different 
methods, and often comes to inconsistent findings. This shows how the complexity of M&A is 
reflected in the attempt to construct a universal framework that defines value creation, its 
measurement and the factors that drive success. Often critics have been moved on existing 
researches for the need of a more integrative perspective (e.g. Cartwright S. et al., 2006; Zollo 
M. et al., 2008; Das A. et al., 2012). 
After having understood the main characteristic of those deals, discussed in the previous part, 
this chapter focuses on M&A performance, thus value creation. Firstly, the performance 
construct is defined, and the main methods used to measure it are explored. Then the main 
factors that determine M&A success are analyzed, looking at the broad existent literature. In 
this part M&A are seen as business processes, thus the related success factors are connected to 
the way a transaction is performed and to the relationship among the bidder and the target during 
the entire process. The strategic acquirer point of view is taken into consideration to come to 
conclusions that integrate concepts and ideas elaborated by various business disciplines.  
 
2.1 M&A Performance and its Measurement  
 
Mergers and acquisitions are tools for implementing business strategies to grow and gain 
competitive advantage. The potential for value creation, in its various forms, seems the reason 
that moves companies to pursue this path instead of organic alternatives. However, empirical 
evidence demonstrates how often those transactions destroy value for acquirers rather than 
create it. While Target firms’ shareholders enjoy positive and statistically significant results, 
acquirers’ shareholders value creation measurement leads to conflicting results that shifts from 
negative to positive abnormal returns registered, not always confirmed by statistical 
significance (e.g. Bruner, 2004). How performance has been defined and measured among 
researchers contributes to explaining these inconsistent outcomes.  
Value creation among studies has been often analyzed looking at a dependent variable that 
measures M&A performance, chosen depending on the objective of the specific study. 
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However, the variable that has been used to measure performance along decades of researches 
has had an important impact on the outcomes. As a consequence, the concept of organizational 
performance in general terms and its measurement have to be analyzed to understand the 
ambiguity around M&A performance.  
 
2.1.1 Organizational Performance Construct 
 
The performance construct has been central in the management research, as it is fundamental 
for the survival and success of a company. Organizational performance is a multifaceted 
construct that relates to different aspects of the business (e.g. profit, sales, market share, 
productivity, debt ratio). Its measurement is seen as a benchmark to gauge the effectiveness of 
managerial decisions and the purpose of the organization (Kapil, 2012). As a consequence, any 
area of management has been interested in measuring performance (Richard et al., 2009).  
Many scholars in the various fields have tried to give a universal definition and a unique 
measure of this concept but failed in providing consensus among disciplines. Organizational 
performance is connected to the broader concept of organizational effectiveness that includes 
organizational performance but incorporates also other internal performance outcomes that go 
beyond economic valuation (Cameron and Whetten, 1983; Richard et al., 2009). The 
importance of these concepts is widely supported, but the treatment of the performance 
construct in research fails to provide an agreement about basic terminology and definition 
(Venkatraman et al., 1986). A way to look at this concept and measure it is using a classificatory 
scheme that sees the overall performance as the result of a combination of two dimensions: 
financial and operational (Cameron and Whetten; 1983, Venkatraman et al., 1986). This 
approach leads to taking into consideration both financial measures, such as accounting-based 
ratios (e.g. ROE, ROS, ROI) or stock-based measures (e.g. market-to-book, stock market 
returns) and operational measures like market share, customer satisfaction, employee 
satisfaction, technological efficiency. The performance construct triggers different interests, 
mirroring the different stakeholders involved in a business decision and concerned about its 
outcome. This multidimensionality of the performance construct is recognized among scholars 
but, empirically often one dimension is taken into consideration in light of the objective of the 
single study and of subjective rather than objective factors involved in the research. The 
financial area and the accomplishment of a company’s economic goals are the most broadly 
studied field (Venkatraman et al., 1986; Barney, 2002).   
Despite economic results have been the main focus, multidimensionality should be taken into 
consideration among researchers to overcome the issue of considering a single dimension in 
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the analysis (Venkatraman et al., 1986). However, among studies, this perspective is 
infrequently taken and when multidimensionality is considered, the actual dimension identified 
appears to depend on the analytical method (quantitative vs qualitative) (Combs et al., 2005). 
In light of these considerations, it is clear that the ambiguity that encompasses M&A 
performance has deeper roots in the concept of performance itself. As a consequence, the 
studies aimed to measure M&A performance mirror the difficulties in assessing performance 
in general terms.  
 
2.1.2 M&A Performance Construct 
 
M&A performance has been the topic of study of broad literature and research that have used 
different approaches to define and measure it. The difficulty in defining deal performance is 
connected to its multidimensionality. On one hand, a transaction triggers different interests 
from shareholders and management to employees, customers, and suppliers. On the other, 
different performance indicators should be used depending on the strategic objective the 
company aims to achieve. Performance goals are different among companies, shaped based on 
their resources and strategic options available (Richard et al., 2009).  
Within the difficulty in treating the concept of performance in research, the methods used 
among scholars to measure it are various. As a consequence, methodological problems can be 
the reason for explaining the inability of empirical studies to evaluate the benefits of M&A 
(Lubaktin, 1983; Brouthers et al., 1998). 
It can be noticed how empirical researches follow a typical design: a dependent variable is 
chosen as a measure of performance, and its variability is explained through the use of factors 
that among literature appear to widely affect it. The measures used as dependent variables in 
statistical models make a first limit clear in connection to the multidimensionality of the 
performance construct. The most used parameters are tight to the financial dimension of the 
organization. Those are either accounting measures or stock measures, leading to the main 
approaches used: accounting-based methods and stock-market based methods, further explored 
in the following paragraph. Therefore, the organizational dimension of performance seems to 
not catch the interest of researchers. The performance variable chosen unlikely reflects this 
perspective, even though several objectives achievable through M&A are directed to the 
organizational dimension. The consequence of having a unilateral perspective is that financial 
performance measures will tend to undervalue the achievement of other goals and may fail to 
provide an accurate picture of M&A success (Brouthers et al., 1998).  Even if financial measure 
prevails among empirical studies, it is important to underline that non-financial measures (e.g. 
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synergy realization degree, integration effectiveness, strategic gap reduction) are present among 
researches and seem to gather more and more importance (Meglio and Risberg, 2011).  
In light of the problems connected to M&A performance measurement, critics about the 
different interpretations of the performance construct among researchers and how it is measured 
are conspicuous. Complexity and uniqueness of each M&A transaction may explain the 
conflicting results obtained by scholars, as comparison among different studies would be at this 
point meaningless (Lubatkin, 1987; Bower, 2001). Moreover, the ambiguity in performance 
measurement may reflect the difficulty in finding a single variable able to reflect the different 
ways that have been used to proxy M&A performance (Zollo et al., 2008).  
In conclusion, one of the main gaps of empirical evidence, broadly underlined by literature, is 
the lack of a universal definition of performance in connection to the multidimensionality of 
the construct. This problem leads to difficulties in the measurement of M&A success. 
Richard et al. (2009) have identified three sources of multidimensionality in the research 
context (a) Who are the stakeholders for whom a performance measure is relevant? (b) What is 
the landscape over which performance is being determined? and (c) What timeframe is relevant 
in measuring performance?  
The authors suggest that performance measurement should take into consideration these 
dimensions. This perspective would guarantee the overcoming of critics often moved when 
performance is measured. In light of these recommendations, the M&A performance construct 
in our empirical study will be defined, specifying the parties to which the construct is relevant, 
the study framework, and the utilized time frame.  
 
2.1.3. Accounting Based Approach vs Stock-Market Based Approach  
 
After exploring the problems connected to the performance construct and its measurement, this 
section aims to further analyze the approaches that dominate the empirical evidence: the 
accounting-based approach and the stock-based approach. As the financial dimension of 
performance dominates studies both approaches identify performance in financial terms, but 
the nature of the variable is different. Moreover, those are similar in the method used that often 
involves statistical models. 
Starting with accounting-based measures those can be classified into three major categories 
(Thanos et al., 2012): 
a) Ratios  
b) Growth measures (sales and profit, assets) 
c) Operating Cash Flow 
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The first category includes some of the main profitability ratios used as a tool to summarize the 
financial statement and the health of a company. The most used ratios in research are return on 
assets (ROA), return on sales (ROS), return on investment (ROI), return on capital employed 
(ROCE), return on equity (ROE). Ratios are used as measures of performance as their 
improvement in comparison to the industry level, competitors, or in relation to the same ratio 
from previous years indicates if the company is resilient. 
Each ratio presents some peculiarities in representing performance, among those ROA appears 
to be the most widely used accounting ratio (Thanos et al., 2011). It depicts how a company is 
efficient in deploying assets to generate sales and eventually profits.  ROA is used by comparing 
the ratio of the acquiring firm before the acquisition with the ROA of the bidder for a certain 
period after the conclusion of the deal, concluding for a successful transaction in case of a 
positive difference. This ratio has been criticized for the industry influence (Harrison et al., 
1991), thus scholars often adjust the measure by subtracting the average industry ROA or 
correcting it according to the firm location (e.g. Zollo et al., 2008). 
Other studies are conducted using growth measures as a proxy for performance. Most often 
these reflect the firm’s financial performance and can be related to various aspects of the 
business such as sales, profits, assets. 
Another recurring measure is operating cash flow (e.g. Haley et al., 1992) that represents the 
cash generated by the normal business operations, thus stands for the real economic benefit 
generated by the assets. It is defined as net operating profit plus non-cash expenses (e.g. 
amortization, depreciation) minus non-cash sales (e.g. receivables). A positive operating cash 
flow indicates that the firm can generate enough cash to finance its operations and boost further 
growth, otherwise the company requires external financing for capital expansion. This measure 
is often adjusted to make it comparable among different firms by dividing it by the market value 
of the assets. Moreover, industry cash flow is computed for taking into consideration events 
that are more industry related than firm related.  
Before moving to the second approach, it is worth understanding what the main advantages and 
disadvantages of this method are. The accounting-based approach as the name suggests is based 
on measures of M&A performance that are available and published in the company’s financial 
statement. As a consequence, the measured performance will not incorporate expectations of 
investors, overcoming the hypothesis that the market is efficient so that all available 
information is embedded in the market prices. The second advantage relates to the fact that it 
is possible to combine different ratios in a single study. This allows inferring at the same time 
different aspects of the company performance, for example by considering altogether 
profitability ratios (e.g. ROE), efficiency ratios (e.g. ROS), and growth in sales. Moreover, 
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those measures can reflect the realization of operational and financial synergies obtained in the 
long run, as the synergistic potential will be reflected in the accounting numbers. 
Despite the mentioned advantages, this approach has been criticized by scholars for different 
reasons. Firstly, it fails in measuring the aspects of performance that are not reflected in 
numbers available in financial reports, intangible assets are an example. Therefore, only the 
objectives related to the economic performance are taken into consideration, whereas the 
motives that explain an M&A transaction are, as we have seen, of different nature. Secondly, 
accounting-based measures ignore the impact of changes in risk on changes in return, a 
shareholder may not benefit from an improved return if the risk of the company is much higher 
(Lubatkin, 1983). Finally, the availability of the data in the financial statement is also connected 
to the third limit of this method. By using information disclosed by companies the accuracy of 
results will also depend on the quality of the financial documents and it is affected by the 
potential numbers’ manipulation of the management in choosing the accounting procedure. 
Moreover, the accounting standards may differ among different countries making cross-border 
comparison difficult. 
The second frequent method utilized to measure M&A performance is the stock-market based 
approach that most often results in event-study methodology. Event studies are used to 
determine whether there is an “abnormal” stock price effect associated with an unanticipated 
event (McWilliams et al., 1997). This method has been widely used in accounting and finance 
to measure the impact of changes in corporate control. It moves from analyzing accounting-
measures of profit to stock-based measures such as abnormal returns and cumulative abnormal 
returns. This methodology applied to M&A is usually operationalized by measuring the effect 
on shareholders returns around the announcement of the transaction, assuming that the 
abnormal return registered is the result of the market reacting to the new information. Usually, 
a short-time event window is taken into consideration because in longer event windows it is 
more likely that confounding events influence the stock price (Brown and Warner, 1980).  
The main benefits of this method are related to the stock measures chosen.  Market-based 
returns to shareholders are direct measures of value created for investors. Moreover, those are 
forward-looking measures, in theory stock prices represent the present value of future cash 
flows (Bruner, 2004; Richard et al., 2009). As a consequence, the main assumption of this 
model is market efficiency that implies that all available information at the announcement of 
the transaction is reflected in the stock price. Furthermore, investors are assumed to be rational. 
A first limit connected to the stock-market approach is related to these assumptions that 
researches suggest being not reasonable for most stocks. The market reaction is affected by the 
investor’s expectations that might turn out to be wrong, moreover it is questionable if investors 
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have all the necessary information available to predict the result of a transaction. Empirical 
research shows how price movements are also explained by financial market volatility (Shiller, 
1989), momentum strategies implemented by investors (Chan et al. 1996), and the tendency in 
the market of “following the herd” (Graham, 1999).  Zollo et al. (2008) consider the short-term 
variation of company stock price as the ex-ante expectation of the market, a collective bet on 
the outcome of the transaction rather than an indicator of the degree of success of a deal. A 
second limit is connected to the short-term perspective often taken in event studies. There is an 
ongoing debate whether the presence of abnormal stock returns around announcement reflects 
an improvement of performance in the long run (Zollo, 2008).  Moreover, short-term market 
measures are not suitable when a deal is more focused on long-term strategic objectives (Das 
et al., 2016).  
A possibility to overcome the limit connected to the short-term perspective of the deal is using 
total returns to shareholders (TRS) over the long run. It results from the combination of the 
increase of the share price over a given period and the dividends paid over the same period. In 
the case of a long-term perspective, a time frame of 10-15 years should be considered (Koller 
et al, 2015). This measure reflects the idea that a company should maximize the value to both 
current and future shareholders. As investors do not have complete information, in the sense 
that they cannot price information they do not have, it may be easy for companies to boost their 
short-term price, while indeed no long-term value creation is generated. In fact, TRS measured 
for short periods may not reflect the company and management performance. Moreover, it does 
not reflect the extent to which improvements in operating performance contribute to total 
shareholder return (Koller et al, 2015). Short-term TRS may also reflect a perverse incentive of 
the management of trying to increase short term return to meet the market expectations or to 
increase their compensation when it is linked to TRS. These situations are connected to 
manager’s choices that may undermine, rather than reinforce long-term value creation. This 
scenario is in line with the Empire-building theory discussed in the first chapter. 
In chapter four the event-study methodology will be used to assess the M&A activity value 
creation. The choice of this approach will be further explored.  
The approaches seen to measure performance have been broadly used among empirical studies. 
The mixed approach, including both accounting and financial market measures, has been 
encouraged by scholars (Lubatkin, 1983). This allows, on one hand, to facilitate the 
comparability among different studies; on the other, to understand the differences among those 
measures (King et al., 2004).   
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2.2. Different Perspectives for Understanding M&A Success 
 
Other than defining and measuring the value creation potential of M&A deals, another objective 
of the studies related to M&A performance has been detecting what the main factors that 
influence the post-acquisition success are. In this way, researches’ conclusions help managers 
in their decision-making process when they find themselves in dealing with such complex 
transactions. As a consequence, researchers more often have taken the acquirer’s perspective, 
in line with the choice of this work. This pattern is also explained by the fact that target’s 
shareholders value creation through large positive economic returns has been unanimously 
demonstrated by scholars (e.g. Datta et al., 1992; Agrawal and Jaffe, 2000; Bruner, 2004). 
Whereas, as mentioned, broad empirical research that focus on the acquiring firm show how 
the average abnormal returns to the bidder are either negative or not statistically different from 
zero (e.g. Franks et al., 1991; Shleifer and Vishny, 1994; Agrawal and Jaffe, 2000; Tuch and 
O’Sullivan, 2007). Even if studies also show positive returns for bidders, empirics do not 
support the performance improvement for the acquirers suggested by organization theory and 
strategic management (Lubatkin, 1983). These mixing results have generated a debate around 
the value creation potential of M&A for acquirers, that is still not solved. The discussed inability 
of empirics to correctly measure M&A success contribute to explain the conflicting outcomes.  
On one hand, different results increase the ambiguity around M&A success, retaining form 
solving the debate around the acquirers’ performance. On the other, discrepancies among 
researches’ outcomes suggest that profitability depends on some success determinants that 
would explain the different level of performance registered among bidders.  
This paragraph aims to stress what are the main factors that affect the acquirer performance 
according to the broad literature and empirical studies. The success factors will be categorized 
according to three main areas that correspond to the business fields that are embodied in these 
transactions: strategic management, finance, organizational behavior (Weber et al.; 2013). 
Those disciplines focus on different aspects of the deal, thus the idea of looking at the outcomes 
from different perspectives, seeks at releasing the set of factors that help explain M&A success. 
This allows taking into consideration the entire process, thus with a more holistic approach.  
The resulting performance determinants will be analyzed and some of them will be tested in 
the last section of the work to see the extent to which these explain the different levels of 





2.2.1. Strategic Management Factors  
 
Strategic management relates to the management of an organization’s resources to achieve its 
goals and objectives by evaluating and deploying a proper strategy.  
The M&A studies conducted by the strategic management field have focused on the 
management of the organization itself and the long-term planning (Weber et al.; 2013). The 
themes related to acquisitions analyzed by this field are multiple. They move from the 
consistency of the M&A strategy with the business strategy to the analysis of the M&A process 
and its implications on the success. Furthermore, the most critical factors for making a deal 
successful have been explored by this field. Those scholars do not focus strictly on the measure 
of success in numerical terms but on those elements that encompass the process and have an 
impact on the deal. 
In reflection to this perspective, the main factors that impact success are summarized in table 
1. 
 
Strategic Management Perspective 
Strategy and Accumulated Experience  
Due Diligence and Target Valuation  
Strategic Fit and Synergies Potential 
Size  
Post-merger Planning and Integration 
Communication 
Table 1: Strategic Management Perspective Factors. Own elaboration. 
 
2.2.1.1 Strategy and Accumulated Experience  
The implementation of an M&A transaction should follow a planning phase. Planning is very 
important for the definition of a business plan and M&A plan, these elements will drive the 
subsequent phases of the process. The definition of a plan involves the elaboration of a mission, 
vision, and business strategy that will ensure to have a clear direction toward the 
implementation of the acquisition. Like any other action, a company takes during its life cycle 
the decision of an M&A should be well-founded and based on a clear definition of scope, 
objectives, and goals. As a consequence, the choice to acquire a firm or merge with another 
firm should result from a well-developed corporate strategy (Payne, 1987).  
A considerable number of researches show that companies that define a clear overall strategy 
are more successful than those that merely react to M&A opportunities (Gomes et al.; 2013). 
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M&A have the potential of creating value in different ways (e.g. expanding into new markets, 
learning processes, increasing scale, differentiation), thus different specific strategies can be 
implemented. However, studies show how corporations that focus on a single strategy are more 
successful (Ambrosini et al., 2011) than those that pursue different strategies in parallel. This 
can be connected to the fact that different strategies require different capabilities and 
organizational structure. Moreover, the implementation of a single strategy enables a clearer 
focus on the final scope, leading to facilitate the post-acquisition implementation phase. 
Deloitte report concerning M&A deals trend (2020) reveals that among the reasons that explain 
the underperformance of M&A transactions there is the lack of definition of M&A strategy. 
The survey respondents have recognized poor strategy deployment as an important factor in 
explaining transactions’ failure (26%). 
Focusing on the capabilities of the acquirer, having experience in M&A deals seems to play a 
role in the transaction’s success. Rehm et al. (2012) have analyzed the performance of 
companies segmenting them according to their M&A programs. They found that companies 
that had completed a lot of acquisitions, either accounting for a large or small part of their 
capitalization, were able to outperform their peers in terms of total returns to shareholders. 
Companies that often engage in M&A transactions as means for growth have the opportunity 
to learn from the continuous and accumulated experience of acquisition activity. It appears clear 
that problems within the acquisition process can be reduced or avoided when the management 
has already experienced the complexity of such deals.  However, it is necessary to recognize 
that each acquisition is highly specific and even if previous experience has a positive impact on 
performance, it is important to not rely too heavily on previous deals (Colombo et al.; 2007). 
Moller, Schlingemann and Stulz (2005) have found that serial acquirers with high valuation 
suffer losses from their acquisitions when the strategy of inorganic growth is no longer 
sustainable.     
 
2.2.1.2 Due Diligence and Target Valuation  
As stressed in the first chapter, Due Diligence is a fundamental process constituting the core of 
the transaction’s pre-purchase phase. This process is expensive and exhausting for the acquiring 
firm and requires a lot of time and attention from the management, but the failure to do an 
exhaustive due diligence can be disastrous. During this phase the target is inspected: its 
commercial, financial, legal information are carefully investigated, reviewed, verified. The 
acquirer should fully understand what it is paying for before the deal is concluded. Both the 
value creation potential and the risks associated with the target should be clear after due 
diligence. This transaction process impacts value creation in different ways. 
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Firstly, effective due diligence should uncover issues (e.g pending litigation, inaccurate 
inventory assessment, weak cash flows) that the target may hide and that may undermine the 
value creation potential of the deal, or even resulting in the acquirer financial ruin (Angwin, 
2001). Secondly, the failure to carefully review may result in concluding that the buyer was not 
reasonable in relying on the statements of the seller, thus the acquirer may be precluded from 
bringing an action against the seller if fraud is discovered after the sale is consummated (Devis, 
2009). Furthermore, proper due diligence helps to plan the post-acquisition integration, 
allowing to define solutions to the identified problem rather than discovering them out of the 
blue once the transaction is concluded.  Finally, the elements discovered in this phase are 
fundamental in setting the price for the binding offer, thus enabling to perform a better valuation 
and make a funded offer. Obtaining better quality information through the process of due 
diligence leads to improved identification and valuation of assets and liabilities intended to be 
acquired (Wangerin, 2010). As a consequence, the due diligence process has been considered 
a key success factor in M&A among scholars (e.g. Shuler and Jackson, 2001; Epstein, 2005). 
The importance of doing a comprehensive due diligence relates to the ability to go beyond 
simple financial or tax due diligence, being sophisticated, and having always in mind the value 
creation strategy the transaction is intended for (PWC, 2020).  
Target valuation needs a particular focus in dealing with transaction success. It is another 
important factor strictly connected to the results obtained through the target investigation 
process. A proper valuation leads to an adequate offer by the acquirer, that should be well aware 
of the maximum amount the target is worth to avoid the overpayment risk. This is fundamental 
when competition among different bidders is faced.  In this scenario, the acquirer should keep 
pursuing the acquisition setting a proper price cap, also considering its financial structure. This 
is important to avoid the target overpayment that may lead to financial distress due to the 
adverse effects on the capital structure of the transaction closing. Prioritizing due diligence and 
accurately valuing a target are some of the factors more cited by managers in defining a 
successful transaction (Deloitte, 2020). 
 
2.2.1.3 Strategic Fit and Synergies Potential 
Strategic fit is connected to value creation when the combination of bidder’s and target’s assets 
are used more effectively by the combined firm than by the two entities separately (Shelton, 
1988). This concept is related to the creation of synergies between the acquirer and the target, 
a higher level of strategic fit increases the chances to benefit from synergies.  
According to Lubatkin (1987) whether a firm gains or loses from an M&A is contingent on 
how the acquirer’s competitive strengths and its market growth rate fit with the same 
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characteristics of the target firm. In this perspective, the more the two companies have common 
or complementary features the greater is the potential created.  It is important to stress that the 
strategic fit assessment should be based on gaps that the acquirer needs to fill in its own strategy: 
the transaction should enrich the acquiring company with something that is missing. 
According to what the acquirer looks for in the target, it is possible to distinguish talent-based 
mergers and cross-industry mergers (Epstein, 2005). With the former, the acquirer seeks a target 
focusing on filling the gap in terms of people, skills, and knowledge to the areas of need. On 
the other hand, cross-industry mergers create value by combining complementary products and 
services to better satisfy customer needs. As a consequence, the fit can be connected to different 
business areas and it should be embedded in the overall strategy. Moreover, the strategic fit 
seems also to affect the likelihood of forming the acquisition. According to Wang and Zajac 
(2007) research, factors such as resource similarity and complementarity, combined relational 
capabilities, and partner-specific knowledge between firms contribute to the successful 
conclusion of a deal.  
Strategic fit is also connected to synergies value creation potential. As already mentioned, 
synergies lead to extra value when the combined companies operating together create value that 
would not be available if the companies had operated independently (2+2=5) (Damodaran, 
2005). The synergies assessment is central for M&A value creation. Moreover, their 
quantification in real, measurable improvements in competitive advantage is fundamental 
(Sirower, 1997). Managers need to work having foreseeable synergies at closing and their 
quantification is fundamental in setting the price. Furthermore, proper identification increases 
the understanding of potential synergies. As a consequence, on one hand, a proper synergies’ 
evaluation enables managers to better develop a strategy that raises the chances to capture the 
extra value post-acquisition. On the other, it increases the clarity in the market, ensuring a 
reaction that is in line with the company expectations. 
Strategic fit is a necessary element to benefit from synergies (Lubatkin 1983; Weber et al., 
2013) but should not be considered as a sufficient aspect for a successful transaction. 
 
2.2.1.4 Size  
As stated previously, a factor that influences M&A success is the similarity among the bidder 
and the target. Literature and research have given attention to the relative size of M&A partners 
(size of the target over bidder’s size). A “size effect” is stressed, suggesting that it is important 
taking into consideration the dimension of the parties in performing a deal. Asquith, Bruner and 
Mullins (1983) have reported that when the target market value was equal to or over 10 percent 
of the acquirer’s market value, the return to the buyer was 4,1 percent. Whereas, when the 
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market value was less than 10 percent the return of the buyer was only 1,7 percent. As a 
consequence, their results have been consistent with the size effect: a relatively larger target 
seems to generate more value.  
Nonetheless, the thesis regarding the relative size moves on two fronts, on one hand, empirics 
show that if the target is relatively larger than the acquirer synergies potential is greater. On the 
other, it is hypothesized that the greater is the size of the acquirer in comparison to the acquired 
firm, the smoother will be the integration process. 
In support of the first view, researchers sustain that the target company should be large enough 
to impact the acquiring firm performance (e.g. Asquith et al, 1983; Bruner, 2002; Tuch et al., 
2007). Moreover, synergies may result more difficult to realize in connection to a size constraint 
when the acquirer is much larger than the target (Kusewitt ,1985; Seth, 1990). Lasson et al. 
(1999) have demonstrated how the relative size matters for the synergy realization, showing 
that the combination potential was higher when the target was larger than the bidder.  
In line with the second front, empirics show how a smaller target relative size has positive 
implications on organizational integration (e.g. Hunt, 1990; Brouthers et al., 1998). 
As a consequence, suboptimal results are achieved both when a large company buys a small 
company, and when targets are very large in comparison to the acquirer (Gomes et al. 2013).  
Focusing on the size of the acquirers, Moeller et al. (2004) have demonstrated how smaller 
acquirers often realize higher returns than larger bidders. This may be explained by the 
overconfidence of managers in larger firms and by the fact that their incentive plan might be 
connected to the overall size of the company, rather to value creating purposes. Moreover, 
larger firms may tend to pursue riskier transactions than smaller firms. 
The size impact on success seems to have discordant effects among empirics, however it seems 
to be connected to success in different ways.  
 
2.2.1.5 Post-merger Planning and Integration 
Post-merger integration is one of the most delicate and important phases for the success of the 
transaction and it is considered one of the main sources of value creation.  
Having done the proper work until the closing of the deal is important, but the integration 
among the two companies and the implementation of the planned strategy is fundamental to 
unfold success. The integration phase requires bland together the management of human 
resources, customer relationships, and technical operations (Epstein, 2005).  
Slow or ineffective integration is one of the commonly cited reasons for mergers and 
acquisitions failing to meet expectations (DePamphilis, 2017). Tough decisions should be made 
early in the process; critical issues have to be prioritized and resources should be concentrated 
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on the objectives that offer the greater payoff. The longer the company takes to act, the greater 
will be the negative effect on success. As a consequence, it is important to be rapid but operating 
having in mind a well-developed strategy and objectives, communicating a clear vision and set 
of values to all employees and other relevant stakeholders.  
Relevant stakeholders should be involved in the integration phase, the firm has to inform them 
promptly about important changes that the company will face concerning the deal. Particular 
attention should be given to customer retention. After the transaction, customers should be of 
central interest to the company. According to Down (1995), a newly merged company will 
experience a loss of 5%- 10% of its existing customers as a direct result of the merger, and the 
loss may continue also after the closing. This loss is connected to the uncertainty about on-time 
delivery, product quality, and more competitive post-merger pricing by competitors 
(DePamphilis, 2017). 
Strategic focus, speed, and communication will ensure to minimize the turnover and the 
possibility to lose key employees, but also suppliers and customers in the case of a protracted 
integration phase. Moreover, particular importance has the cultural integration of the two firms, 
both from an organizational perspective and from the strictly cultural point of view in case of 
cross- border acquisitions; those elements will be further analyzed.  
According to Deloitte (2020), an effective integration process is the single most important 
factor that leads to successful transactions.   
 
2.2.1.6 Communication 
Managing communication in periods of organizational change if fundamental. As a 
consequence, during M&A transactions that often lead to important changes for firms, 
communication is essential throughout the process. 
The communication stream should ensure the proper flow of information to both employees 
and other stakeholders. This contributes to limiting misunderstandings that may generate, not 
only higher turnover, but also loss of stakeholders’ confidence. The way in which the acquiring 
company communicates its intentions to the target is also of great importance in managing the 
stakeholder’s expectations (Gomes et al., 2013).  
The increase of uncertainty that follows these transactions has an important impact on the 
human dimension. The decrease in satisfaction, commitment, intention to stay with an 
organization, and trust in the company are affected. These aspects will be further analyzed, but 
realistic and effective communication is a central tool to mitigate these situations and cope with 
the increased uncertainty that may have an adverse impact on the deal success (Shweiger et al., 
1991). It is recommended by researchers to create early in the process a flexible and 
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comprehensive communication program. The impacts of the integration process should be 
communicated to the organizational members and relevant stakeholders as soon as possible 
(Papadakis, 2005).  
Where poor communication can considerably undermine the M&A performance (Jemison & 
Sitkin, 1986; Inkpen et al., 2000; Angwin,2001), a transparent flow of information among the 
parties affected by the transaction can be considered an important component of M&A success 
(Gall, 1991; Smith and Hersman, 1999; Bryson, 2003).  
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2.2.2 Financial and Market Factors  
 
Finance is a broad term that describes activities associated with banking, capital structure, 
capital markets, money and investments. Within a company, finance represents money 
management and the process of acquiring the needed funds (Kurt, 2019). It is strictly connected 
to econometrics, which is the quantitative application of statistical and mathematical models 
using data to develop theories or test existing hypotheses. However, econometrics is used by 
all fields of study to demonstrate hypotheses related to any business field. 
Financial literature has focused on M&A with the “market for corporate control perspective”, 
where those transactions have been viewed as contests between management teams for the 
control of corporate entities (Datta et al., 1991). Researchers with this perspective have mainly 
focused on the measurement of a transaction success by considering the change in the stock 
rates in the days around the announcement. As mentioned before, it is widely proved that 
acquiring company shareholders do not profit in the capital market at announcement and the 
main reasons given by those scholars is the overpayment of the target company (Weber et al., 
2013). Also accounting-based measures have been widely used by those scholars to assess the 
success of M&A transactions.  
The set of determinants that seem to mainly impact the performance of the deal, with a more 
financial perspective, are summarized in table 2 and mainly relates to the payment 
characteristics of the deal and the market condition at the moment of the transaction.  
 
Financial perspective 
Overpayment and Premium 
Mode of Payment and Financing  
Table 2: Finance Perspective Factors. Own elaboration. 
 
2.2.2.1 Overpayment and Premium 
The price paid for the transaction is strictly connected to the valuation process the acquirer 
operates to get to the binding offer. This price reflects the value of the company that has been 
assessed during due diligence, incorporating the value of expected synergies and a control 
premium. The latter occurs when the acquirer pays for a controlling interest to have complete 
control over the business. However, what is often called a “control premium” in the popular 
press is actually an acquisition premium that includes both a premium for synergies and a 
premium for control (Weber et al., 2013). The acquisition premium equals the difference 
between the price paid and the estimated real value of the target company pre-acquisition. 
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All the components that are embedded in the final price contribute to the risk of overpayment 
that results from paying significantly more than the economic value of the acquired company.  
The overpayment may prevent firms from recovering the premium paid for synergies, thus in 
the case the premium exceeds the benefits achievable through synergies the creation of a 
positive return is armed (Sirower, 1997).  
Paying too much is connected to other reasons rather than synergies and control; these include 
agency factors, presence of other competing bidders, consolidation trends, and desire to acquire 
technology firms (Hitt et al., 2012).  Management may engage in opportunistic behaviors when 
they are concerned more about company growth than the actual increase in shareholders’ value. 
As already mentioned, the agency problem is more likely to arise when the management is 
incentivized by a compensation plan connected to the company growth. The alignment of 
managers’ and shareholders’ objectives can influence the amount of premium paid (Slusky and 
Caves, 1991). Another reason for overpayment is connected to a competitive factor, if more 
potential acquirers place bids for the same target, the price paid by the acquirer will be higher. 
It is identified by “the winner’s curse” problem that occurs when multiple bidders made their 
own evaluation, but even if unbiased, the higher valuation will be above the true value leading 
the winner probably to overpay the target (Coff, 2002). 
Sirower (1997) proposes other reasons that can lead to overpayment such as the unfamiliarity 
with fundamentals and acquisition strategy, the lack of adequate knowledge of the target and 
market conditions, and the unexpected problems that might occur during the integration 
process. 
Studies also show a negative relationship between acquisition premium and post-acquisition 
organizational performance (Haunschild 1994, Beckman and Haunschild 2002; Krishnan et al. 
2007), the pressure the management has to sustain not only for meeting the expectation of the 
market but also for covering the acquisition cost may explain this relationship. 
The poor investment returns and the burden on the management contribute to the failure of the 
transaction, thus overpayment is considered one of the major causes of failure. 
 
2.2.2.2 Mode of Payment and Financing  
The mode of payment and mode of financing are other factors that seem to influence the 
acquisition success, as valuable information for investors. Those decisions have implications 
the one for the other, thus it is better to make the choice simultaneously.  
A company in the acquisition context can choose either cash or stock financing, or a 
combination of the two. The result mode depends on the negotiation; however, it impacts the 
value creation potential in different ways (Datta et al., 1991). 
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Assuming rational management of the acquiring firm, it will seek to pay the transaction in the 
most profitable way. A stock payment will be chosen if the management thinks that its stocks 
are overvalued. As a consequence, a stock deal communicates to the market that the acquiring 
company is overpriced leading to a negative impact on the bidder stock value. On the other 
hand, paying with cash gives a positive message to the market. It signals that the acquiring 
company expects a particularly strong post-acquisition performance (King et al., 2004), as in a 
cash deal the acquiring firm will maintain the corporate identity and ownership structure 
without risk or reward sharing.   
Moreover, the decision of how to pay is strictly connected to the choices about financing. In 
general, paying with stock generates financial flexibility, while paying with cash consumes it 
(Bruner, 2004). A stock deal is financed either with stock available in the treasury, already 
approved by shareholders, or by the issuing of new stocks. Whereas a cash deal may recur to 
extra cash available, may be financed issuing new debt or issuing new stocks. All the mentioned 
decisions impact in some extent the debt capacity of the firm, thus resulting in affecting the 
company debt rating and cost of debt that in turn may impact the post-acquisition success.  
The decisions about the mode of payment and financing give insights about how the seller 
values the target, thus a company should carefully take into consideration the information that 
its choice transmits to the market. 
Empirical evidence shows how the mode of payment impacts buyer value creation. Cash deals 
seem to generate on average greater returns for the acquirer than stock deals (e.g. Travolos, 
1987; Antoniou et al., 2004; Faulkner et al., 2012). However, some researchers do not agree in 
the payment mode being a significant variable in determining the deal value creation (e.g. King 
et al., 2004).  
This suggests that the mode of payment influence is complex and may depend upon other 
several factors such as the size of the premium paid, stock market cycle, M&A cycle (Hitt, 
2012).  Changes in interest rates and stock prices are strongly related to changes in M&A design 
over time (Bruner, 2004). For example, stock purchases prevail in periods of booms in the stock 
market. This is connected to the overvaluation theory, according to which acquirers buy with 
stocks when their shares are overestimated. 
The choice between cash or equity provides insights on how the management values its share 
and on the acquirer ability to unlock value through an acquisition (Palmer, 2019), hence the 
management should carefully consider this information effect in the decision for a cash or stock 




2.2.3 Organizational Behaviors Factors  
 
The importance of the human factor of a business is relevant along all its life cycle and it should 
be considered in every important business decision to make a firm operate more effectively.  
Organizational Behavior is the academic study of the ways people act within groups. In 
connection to M&A, researchers in this field have focused on the recurrent lack of attention of 
the human factor during the process of the planning and implementation of a deal (Weber et al., 
2013).  
Causes of failure are connected to managers and employees that do not adjust to the M&A for 
cultural or management style differences. As a consequence, not only the full exploitation of 
the synergy potential is limited, but also the acquirer may face considerable costs. This 
perspective is particularly relevant during the integration phase when the target and acquirer 
jointly form a new entity. The success determinants are summarized in table 3. 
 
Organizational Behavior Perspective 
Cultural Fit  
Organizational Fit 
The Human Dimension  
Table 3: Organizational Behavior Perspective Factors. Own elaboration. 
 
2.2.3.1 Cultural Fit  
Corporate culture is a common set of values, traditions, and beliefs that influence management 
and employees’ behavior within a firm (DePamphilis, 2017). 
The role of culture in M&A has been a studied topic among scholars and researchers. They 
have considered culture at multiple levels of analysis including National, Regional, Industrial, 
Company, and Professional levels (Gomes, 2013).  
What appears clear from the studies is that the relationship culture-performance is complex. On 
one hand, it is suggested that cultural differences can create an obstacle to achieve integration 
benefits. On the other, these dissimilarities, appear also as a source of value creation and 
learning (Stahl and Vogit, 2007). However, the implication that culture affects M&A 
performance is clear among researchers and literature often uses the term “cultural fit” to 
express the relationship that should be sought among the two companies‘ cultures during the 
screening and integration process.  
The culture role may be connected to different phases of the transaction: it may affect the 
expectation of investors about the future performance of the firm, task integration may be 
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impacted, and also human integration relies profoundly on culture. All these elements 
contribute to drawing the relationship between culture and value creation. The cultural aspect 
matters especially dealing with cross-border transactions. 
Investors’ expectations are based on all available information, and culture matters in defining 
their beliefs. The market may interpret the announcement of such a deal as riskier in terms of 
post-acquisition administrative and consolidation costs.  
The integration process as we have already mentioned is particularly relevant for the success 
of the deal, and it is widely impacted by culture, whose effect is twofold. According to 
Birkinshaw (2000), integration is an interactive process where both sociocultural and task 
integration efforts are required, this perspective is taken to analyze the culture’s role in the 
integration phase.  
Sociocultural integration can be defined as the creation of a positive attitude toward the newly 
formed organization and a sense of shared identity and trust among the organizational members 
(Stahl and Vogit, 2007). In this perspective the role of culture is fundamental and great effort 
is required to integrate properly different cultures to avoid conflicts between the amalgamating 
firms and thus adverse effects on performance (Gomes et al., 2013).  
Task integration relates to how the operations of the two companies integrate together. Thus, 
in line with the resource-based view, cultural differences can be seen as an asset, a source of 
cross-learning among the two companies. The positive interaction may lead to innovation and 
a richer knowledge structure (Barkema, 2001), providing access to unique routines and 
capabilities in the acquired firm (Morosini et al., 2008). However, the benefits related to cultural 
differences are connected to the size of the difference and the successful management of the 
transfer of capabilities, resource sharing and learning (Björkman et al., 2007). Both socio-
cultural and task integration affect the acquirer’s ability to exploit and realize synergies, having 
an impact on the success and value creation of the transaction.  
Sthal and Vogit (2007) tried to reconcile the conflicting perspective and findings related to the 
implication of culture in performance through a series of meta-analysis. The results have 
suggested that cultural differences affect sociocultural integration, synergy realization, and 
shareholder value in different and sometimes opposing ways. Culture impacts result to depend 
on aspects of the acquirer-target relationship such as the dimension of cultural differences and 
degree of relatedness. 
According to a survey involving more than 7000 business executives, 82% of the participants 
viewed culture as a source of competitive advantage (Deloitte, 2016). 
Cultural differences matter in M&A and management should be attentive on how those affect 
the integration process and on how to manage them more effectively. Culture is one of the most 
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unpredictable factors of the deal success that should be put at the center of the integration 
process (PWC, 2019). It takes collaboration and collective efforts to build a common corporate 
culture, consisting of new organizational values, standards, and beliefs shared by the employees 
of both the target and the buyer company.  
 
2.2.3.2 Organizational Fit  
Organizational fit is another dimension of the relatedness between the target and the acquirer 
that may impact the deal performance. Organizational fit can be defined considering various 
dimensions, but here the focus is on the difference of the management style among the acquiring 
and acquired company and the importance of the leadership role in the post-acquisition phase. 
The management style has been proven to be a predictor of performance and the difference 
among different styles has been a factor considered particularly important in the post-
acquisition phase (Datta, 1991). The management style can be defined as the set of principles, 
methods, techniques used by managers to handle situations and express leadership within an 
organization. It comprises different factors such as attitude to risk, decision-making approach 
and control, and communication patterns. As a consequence, the management style is unique 
among organizations and can take different forms.  In the M&A setting this factor results to be 
particularly important. The creation of a unique organization leads two management groups to 
come together and the integration among different management styles may lead to problems 
that may undermine the acquisition performance. The acquiring firm tends to impose its style, 
especially when it thinks to be able to improve the target effectiveness, leading to potential 
tensions. Datta (1991) has shown how the management style is important for superior 
performance both in low and high levels of post-acquisition integration operations. One may 
think that the impact of the management style is lower when the interactions among 
management groups are low. However, the target management is often subject to scrutiny and 
control by the acquirer even if the post-merger interaction is limited (Datta, 1991). Differences 
in management style contribute to post-acquisition problems, undermining the peace of the 
integration process, thus increasing the difficulties of achieving operational synergies.  
Another aspect to take into consideration is management leadership. The acquiring firm chooses 
also the type of executive in charge of managing the company after the acquisition, facing the 
decision to retain the existing management or replace it. Angwin and Meadows (2007) in their 
study consider the different styles of integration and distinguish insider and outsider 
managements. They found a positive relationship between the use of insiders and acquisition 
characterized by a high level of autonomy. On the other hand, they observed that when the 
interdependence among the two firms was high, thus a new perspective in the management was 
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required, outsiders were more prepared to make radical changes. Moreover, they were more 
objective and had lower emotional attachment than insiders. This suggests that hiring new 
executives to manage the integration process would be better when the acquiring company 
intends to make important changes in the target. Poor management during implementation is a 
cause of M&A failure (Prichett et al, 1997). It is important to select executives able to 
implement the right changes that allow a proper integration that meets the expectations of both 
organizations.   
The acquiring company management should be conscious of the importance of the 
organizational dimension in making their decisions; the relevance of management style and 
leadership have been discussed.  Open communication and mutual respect among management 
groups help to overcome these difficulties and achieve successful acquisitions.  
 
2.2.3.3 The Human Dimension 
Human Resource Management in M&A plays a key role as the human dimension is central for 
achieving business effectiveness, that cannot be reached without productive, motivated 
employees.  
Acquisitions lead to complexity and uncertainty, a new organization is formed with potential 
changes in the structure, processes, systems. As a consequence, the workforce is highly 
impacted, making the management of the human capital fundamental for an efficient 
integration. Moreover, M&A provides a fertile ground for job insecurity, unfair treatment, 
procedural injustice. While the management wants to maximize efficiency, workforce 
instability is a risk for the acquisition success (Bryson, 2003).  
The loss of key people and employee turnover are great risks that the company may face. To 
overcome these problems, the perception of job security and workforce stabilization play a 
major role during a merger (Schweiger et al., 1987). Moreover, targeting key staff for retention 
is important to ensure continuity in the business, considering not only executives but all relevant 
employees. 
Researchers also show the importance of procedural fairness in determining the staff attitude 
toward the deal (Ashkenas et al., 1998; Brockner et al., 1994). In these terms, as already 
mentioned, communication plays a fundamental role. Management should promptly and 
frequently communicate changes. Open communication enables to strengthen the employees’ 
trust and limits uncertainty and rumors. 
Poor human resource management may impact the synergy realization and the possibility of 
transferring skills and resources, thus influencing deal performance and its success.  
 44 
3. M&A in Downturns 
 
The previous chapter has focused on defining the debate around M&A value creation and on 
exploring the determinants that contribute to defining deal success. Various discipline 
perspectives have been taken into consideration and the resulting value creating factors are 
strictly connected to the firms, deal characteristics, and to the relationship between the bidder 
and the target company. However, M&A activity is also connected to external conditions that 
drive to a different extent the realization of those deals. There is not a direct relationship 
between the deal’s success and external environment, but rather between favorable external 
conditions and the volume and value of activity registered. M&A activity does not disappear 
during difficult times, but the external environment inevitably influences the decision-making 
process of firms that have to deal with value creating growth strategies when reacting to critical 
times. Therefore, it is interesting to explore the role of M&A in case of unfavorable external 
conditions, and how the value creation implications are impacted by distressed scenarios. 
In this chapter the external environment is firstly taken into consideration, trying to overcome 
the company borders and analyze the determinants of M&A having a broader picture in mind. 
After having explored the external factors that according to literature and empirics contribute 
to thriving deal activity, an analysis of what happens when those fail to occur is done. Good 
economic conditions boost deal activity, however there is still a question mark on what happens 
to M&A in bad economic times when companies are forced to work in a distressed scenario. 
This dissertation will analyze in particular the recent Covid-19 crisis, its economic impacts, and 
consequences on the M&A activity. 
 
3.1 M&A Relation with the Environment  
 
From the last century until today M&A have clustered in waves, enabling us to understand what 
the main drivers of the cyclical nature of those transactions are. Waves are defined by periods 
of time characterized by relatively a large number of mergers reported simultaneously in many 
industries where this activity intensifies at an increasing rate and then declines rapidly (Reid, 
1968). This cyclical pattern can also be noticed taking into consideration the years 1990-2019 




Graph  1: Worldwide M&A volume in dollars. Source: Institute for Mergers, Acquisition, and Alliances (IMAA) 
 
The cyclicality nature suggests that common factors contribute to define the M&A activity, 
leading to suppose that it is connected to more macroeconomic factors such as the business 
cycle, the stock market condition, aggregate demand, among others (Choi and Jeon, 2010).  
In general terms, the cycle tends to shift upward in connection to economic expansion and 
booms in the stock market. For example, the wave that occurred between 1992 and 2000 took 
place in a decade characterized by great economic prospects, booming of the financial markets, 
and globalization (DePamphilis, 2017). On the other hand, M&A activity tends to be weaker in 
years of recession and recovery. Exemplary are the dot-com bubble (2000-2002) and the 
Great Recession (2007-2009) periods when a deal drop has been registered. 
The main external factors connected to the deal environment that contribute to determining 
M&A volume and value are discussed. It will be clear how downturns define an unfertile 
ground for deal activity. 
 
3.1.1 The External Environment  
 
The external environment is defined as the totality of factors outside an organization that are 
taken into consideration in its decision making (Duncan, 1972). Thus, the environment in which 
a company operates is a fundamental element to consider for determining business decisions 
and their success. Outside the company’s wall, the environment plays a major role in shaping 
a business and it can be analyzed taking different perspectives. 
As mentioned, M&A have occurred in waves and numerous scholars have tried to explain the 
dynamics in merger activity, other than its success. The directions this problem has been 
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(Choi and Jeon, 2010). Aspects of all these perspectives contribute in explaining what boost 
M&A activity. 
A positive correlation has been found between the stock market and mergers activity (Gort, 
1969; Guerard, 1989; Rhodes-Kropf and Viswanathan, 2004); booms in stock markets are 
proven drivers of M&A activity where overvaluation plays a major role (Shleifer and Vishny, 
2003). Bidders with overvalued stocks buy assets of undervalued targets through stock 
acquisitions. The target managers when having a short-term perspective accept the overvalued 
counterparty equity, this situation leads to an increase in M&A activity. A similar perspective 
explains waves in relation to a rational acceptance by the target of the bidder overvalued equity. 
This is due to imperfect information of the management about the degree of synergies in periods 
of market valuation peeks, rather for too short-term management perspective. 
Technology changes and regulatory shocks that incur in industries also contribute to defining 
the propensity of new deals (Gort, 1969; Mulherin, 1996). The Neoclassical explanation of 
M&A waves is based on the economic disturbance that leads to industry reorganization. When 
an industry oversees technological, regulatory, economic shocks the firms inside and outside 
the industry react by reallocating assets through mergers and partial acquisitions.  This theory, 
already mentioned in the second chapter of the work, has been confirmed in more recent studies. 
Harford (2005) by studying the merger between 1981 and 2000 has supported the relevance of 
those elements but underlies that whether the shocks lead to a merge wave depends on the 
availability of capital liquidity. The macro-level liquidity component causes industry mergers 
waves to cluster in time even if industry shocks do not (Harford, 2005). The combination of 
economic motivations and relatively low transaction costs contribute to the deals’ increase. 
Hence, the Neoclassical hypothesis is modified to take into consideration the available liquidity 
in the market.  
Switching to the firm perspective, it looks at internal microeconomic factors.  This dimension 
is taken into consideration dealing with the external environment, as a matter of completeness. 
All dimensions that contribute to pushing deal activity want to be mentioned.  Jensen (1986, 
2005) demonstrates that important business factors are the cash flow and cash reserves 
availability. The higher those elements are within a firm, the more the management will take 
aggressive decisions about M&A transactions. This has been confirmed by more recent studies 
(e.g. Choi and Jeon, 2010), thus company performance results to be a factor to take into 
consideration. A low level of financial constraints and high cash flow have been founded to 
support transactions activity (Shleifer and Vishny, 2003).   
The micro level perspective and that involving the stock market are juxtaposed to the view of 
other researchers that found that most M&A activity has taken place almost simultaneously 
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across firms and industries, leading to the macroeconomics drivers. With this perspective, 
M&A waves are explained by common factors that influence the state of the aggregate 
economy. Choi and Jeon (2010), studying the M&A data in the US economy between 1980 and 
2004, have demonstrated the important role that the macroeconomic environment plays in 
determining the trends of merger activity.  
The macroeconomic factors that have been studied as important variables for explaining the 
deal frequency are the interest rate, GDP, aggregate demand, and the economic cycle. Melicher 
et al. (1983) study has demonstrated that M&A activity tends to reflect the expectations of a 
more receptive capital market condition characterized by higher stock prices and a lower 
interest rate. The correlation between merger activity and interest rates has been identified also 
by other studies (e.g. Becketti, 1986; Guerard 1989). The principal reason for this relationship 
is that a large part of mergers is financed wholly or partially by debt or debt issuing, thus as 
interest rate changes, the cost of funds used for acquiring firms changes. As a consequence, 
merger activity is expected to decline as interest rates rise (Becketti, 1986). Moreover, also the 
availability of credit influences the merger activity. More debt is available at a cheaper price, 
higher the volume of transactions is expected to be. 
A relation has also been identified between mergers and GDP ( Becketti 1986, Guerard, 1989, 
Choi and Jeon, 2010). Looking at the link between the real economy and the merger activity, it 
is discussed the impact of the economic dimension that concerns the production, purchase, and 
flow of goods on mergers. An increase in merger activity is expected with shifts in the aggregate 
demand (Becketti, 1986). If an acquisition is considered as a new investment, comparable to a 
new plant or the purchase of new equipment this becomes clear. However, an important 
difference relies on the fact that a firm’s output is expected to expand more rapidly in the case 
of a merger than in the scenario of a new capital investment.  
Furthermore, the rate at which M&A activity increase is expected is greater when the economy 
is producing near its capacity. As a consequence, merger activity is positively connected to an 
expected higher demand, and when the capacity utilization rate is high (Becketti, 1986). 
Moreover, the increase in production connected to the merger activity expansion, will itself 
contribute to the increase of the aggregate output.  
Taking into consideration the business cycle, according to Choi and Jeon (2010) the ascending 
phase is the most favorable business environment for mergers. Thus, expansion phases 
characterized by economic prosperity both in the real and financial economy ensure a fertile 
ground for M&A transactions. 






Environmental Determinants of M&A Activity 
Stock Market Level Stock Price 
 Stock market volatility 
 Stock market behavior 
Industry Level Economic, Technological, Regulatory stocks 
 Capital liquidity 
Firm Level Cash flow availability 
 Reserves availability 
 Company Performance 
Macroeconomic Level Interest rate 
 GDP 
 Aggregate demand 
 Business/economic cycle 
Table 4: Environmental Determinants of M&A. Own Elaboration. 
 
The total environment in its dimensions and characteristics has been proven to influence the 
merger activity in terms of volume and value, nonetheless most researchers have focused on 
the firm related events and conditions. This probably is because a merger is a firm specific 
event. However, the waves that have characterized mergers’ pattern, lead to think that empirics 
and literature should move to consider more external forces when dealing with M&A activity. 
Focusing on the present environment and the expected scenario in which companies have to 
operate, the external drivers couldn’t be more important. Covid-19 pandemic has put pressure 
on society in different perspectives and the M&A market has not been immune to the disruptive 
changes.   
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3.2 M&A as a Growing and Changing Tool in Distressed Scenarios  
 
The most favorable external factors that contribute to boosting deal activity have been 
discussed, but a question mark arises about what happens to M&A transactions when the main 
determinants that thrill deal activity fail to occur. 
In a distressed economic scenario when a crisis hits the real and financial economy all the 
environmental dimensions are highly affected. The macroeconomic scenario shifts and new 
conditions define the playground. Employment, interest rate, supply, and demand are inevitably 
affected by the crisis and impacted by the monetary and fiscal policies defined in response to 
the situation. The stock market prices tend to fall and call for volatility, investors lose 
confidence in the market and risk aversion prevails over bold transactions; shifting towards the 
more secure assets. Industries are under pressure for action to respond to the crisis.  
In such a scenario, companies have to develop and implement strategies that not only ensure 
the going concern status but also enable them to move forward in the business life cycle. 
Managers can opt for different paths to counteract difficult times, however growing is always 
an option.  
M&A are complex and costly growing tools; therefore, it comes clear asking what the role of 
these transactions is in distressed situations and how value creation is affected. 
The dot-com bubble in 2000-2002 and the Great Recession of 2007-2009 have demonstrated 
how in adverse economic scenarios M&A activity tends to decrease as companies revisit their 
acquisition plans. However, downturns are proven to be times where deal activity has the 
potential to unfold success. The main strategic approaches implemented during hard times are 
explored looking for M&A activity space in those periods. Then, the M&A role during 
distressed scenarios and the elements that businesses should take into consideration to unfold 
success, are explored. 
 
3.2.1 Unfold Success in Hard Times 
 
The cyclicality of the economic cycle teaches that downturns are expected to come as an 
inevitable part of the business life. Even if predicting a recession is hard a crisis can always 
occur and particularly refers to the contraction phase of the cycle. Despite the peculiar 
conditions that characterize critical periods, there are some recession-driven changes that 
characterize downturns and constitute the predictable side of those situations. 
The decline of the economic activities leads customers to spend less, with the consequences of 
lower resources available for firms. Moreover, margins fall and productivity declines (Pearce 
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and Stevens, 2005). Recessions also make bank loans difficult to get, as banks are acting 
themselves to survive. As a consequence, credit institutions became particularly concerned 
about the loan portfolio quality, thus companies that may be more in need see their credit 
availability jeopardized. Businesses can leverage on these predictable aspects of crises to 
prepare for hard times and in this way be ready to counteract conditions that may threaten their 
survival. Preparation and planning help firms to face adverse economic scenarios and increase 
the chance to gain market share and pull ahead over competitors despite critical times. 
Managers should anticipate the available strategic options to counteract hard times, resiliency 
over different scenarios is more important than a good recovery plan (Guidara, 2019). A Bain 
and Company research found that companies that deploy well prepared strategies outperform 
their peers during and after a crisis (Holland and Katzin, 2019). In fact, opportunities for value 
creation do not cease to exist even during downturns. However, independently from the crisis 
characteristics and the work done, the higher the uncertainty is, the harder is managing a 
business.  
Turning to action, the strategies that companies deploy are various, and little research has been 
done around those that help companies to survive in hard times (Gulati et al., 2010). What is 
clear is that firms do not follow the same strategy during downturns, a wide variety of possible 
strategic actions are possible. In general terms, companies have to make the hard decision 
between reducing expenses to retain resources with a more conservative approach or invest in 
new products and/or processes exploiting weaknesses that other companies may face (Kitching 
et al., 2009). The continuum of possibilities sees at its extremes on one hand retrenchment 
strategies, on the other investment strategies. Retrenchment strategies involve cutting operating 
costs and divesting in non-core assets to retain cash, thus more defensive tactics. On the other 
hand, investment strategies are put in place when firms see opportunities for new investments, 
expansion, and innovation as ways to overcome difficult times. These approaches are not 
mutually exclusive, and their action depends also on the environment in which a company 
operates. Nevertheless, a combination of both perspectives seems to create the greatest value. 
When companies, after retrenchment strategies, are able to redirect the remaining resources 
toward more promising product-market combinations a successful turnaround may be at the 
door (Robinson and Pearce, 1992). Introducing new products and trying to attract new 
customers are especially effective during a recession (Pearce and Stevens, 2005). Competitors 
are more “quiet” as busy to counteract the crisis. Moreover, customers seem to appreciate more 
innovation for the lack of new products and services that characterizes those periods. Customer 
focus should be a priority in downturns; retention and attraction of new clients are fundamental 
during critical times and have the potential to create extra value once the recovery starts. The 
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Great Recession has demonstrated that actions taken to survive and wait for the recovery were 
not enough to succeed in the long run (Salsberg, 2020). The potential of a proactive attitude 
toward difficult times goes over the survival through the crisis. Once the recovery begins and 
the economy starts to grow again, firms that have undertaken bolder strategic decisions will be 
prepared to face the demand increase and maintain or even improve their position in the 
marketplace.   
The benefits connected to an offensive rather than defensive attitude are proven also 
empirically. An analysis conducted by Gulati et al. (2010) has focused on the study of 
companies’ performance during three recessions, considering three years before the crisis, the 
recession period, and three years after it. They found that companies that succeed are those able 
to balance the need of cutting costs, survive and invest in growth. They conclude that the 
combination of defensive and offensive tactics has the highest probability to succeed (Gulati et 
al., 2010). The right mix to outperform focuses on operational efficiency, developing into new 
markets, and enlargement of the asset base.  
In the context of companies able to pursue offensive strategies that include investing in R&D, 
expanding into new businesses, developing new products; managers have to decide possible 
paths and strategic options, taking into consideration multiple alternatives, among which M&A 
deals find a place.  
 
3.2.2 M&A Role and Value Creation Implications 
 
M&A, as growing tools and thanks to the multiple objectives achievable through them, can help 
companies to deploy their strategy and demonstrate resilience in hard times. Engaging in M&A 
transactions in downturns seems counterintuitive, one may think that a company should focus 
more on retaining liquidity and wait for the recovery, than investing money in external growth.  
In fact, despite the potential of undertaking new investments in uncertain times, it is not an easy 
decision to make. A survey of Hogan Lovell carried out among companies, shows how 9 out 
of 10 firms have identified uncertainty as a barrier for investments (Hogan Lovell, 2012). As a 
consequence, increasing uncertainty that characterizes downturns leads companies to focus 
more on internal growth and firm restructuring, probably perceived as less risky and more under 
control.  
Even if making an M&A transaction is not an easy decision, investing in external growth is a 
sign of a proactive attitude toward an unfavorable environment that if properly done has a high 
potential to reward the firm: crisis and volatility also generate opportunities (Citi, 2012). A 
recent study conducted by the Boston Consulting Group demonstrates how the acquirer’s total 
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shareholder return increased by 7% in operation closed during crisis periods considering two 
years after the deal (BCG, 2019). The market seems to reward bold acquirers that pursue M&A 
activities during hard times. This result is consistent with a PWC analysis, according to which 
companies that have made deals during a downturn benefit from higher shareholder returns than 
peers in the same industry (PWC, 2020).  
Other than strategic tools in the hand of companies even under unfavorable conditions, M&A 
are a way to quickly adapt to the conditions set by the crisis. In line with the Neoclassical 
explanation of M&A, when an industry oversees technological, economic shocks the firms 
within the industry will react by reallocating assets through mergers and acquisitions. A recent 
example is the digitalization need that Covid-19 has reinforced that has led companies to adapt, 
recurring to M&A among other available tools. 
M&A transactions, as mentioned before, have been broadly analyzed in literature but they have 
not been explored to the same extent during downturns. If opportunities and success could arise, 
a question mark is still present about which companies are able to exploit those opportunities 
and how this can be done. 
After focusing on the business profile of companies able to ride the wave, the elements that 
contribute to the success of the transaction in adverse economic scenarios are explored, trying 
to understand the most critical steps when uncertainty increases. 
 
3.2.2.1 Success Determinants During Critical Times  
 
A downturn does not affect all companies equally, thus new potential buyers and sellers come 
into play in the M&A market. The acquirers’ profile that has the most potential to create value 
through M&A in a downturn is characterized by companies with high liquidity, strong 
financials and the risk tolerance to move quickly (Salsberg, 2020). The firm dimension 
discussed in the first part of the chapter has already stressed how cash flow availability 
contributes to thriving M&A activity. Excess liquidity can be utilized to perform deals with a 
view over the long-term shareholder value creation, instead of using it for less value creating 
activities, such as dividend payment and share buybacks. Strong financials make the company 
able to exploit lower valuation multiples that characterize hard times. If a strategic deal is 
available, the company is strong enough to invest and gather the necessary resources to close 
the deal. Moreover, the low cost of capital that has characterized crises can be utilized by the 
companies that have still debt capacity to be exploited. It is clear that companies with a strong 
balance sheet and good recent economic performance are better positioned to perform inorganic 
growth options. On the other hand, firms with less favorable financial positions and those that 
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rely more on debt financing will have to take a step back, with the possibility of even becoming 
potential targets. 
Bold decisions involving investing during a downturn instead of more conservative approaches 
require risk tolerance as the crisis implication consequences are not fully known until the 
recovery starts. Industry leaders are able to balance risks and capitalize on the best target 
opportunities (Ficery et al., 2009). 
Another acquirer characteristic to consider is the previous deal experience. However, it plays a 
role but does not seem a major determinant of success. Deal experience contributes to 
facilitating the process as the company should already have the proper structure and tools to 
support the acquisition plan during downturns. Nevertheless, as mentioned before in the work, 
past successful history does not always lead to replicating the trend. Every downturn has proper 
characteristics, and nothing should be considered as given.  A Boston Consulting Group study 
shows how both experienced (more than four deals concluded) and occasional buyers (less than 
four deals closed) create value for M&A in weak economic times generating positive total 
shareholders return. However, it is demonstrated that experienced buyers apply their knowledge 
and outperform occasional dealmakers. A positive two-years TRS of 7,3% has been registered 
for more active buyers versus a two-years TRS of 1,4% for occasional buyers (BCG, 2019). 
Furthermore, to increase the value creation deal potential, the acquirers have to master the entire 
M&A process. The success determinants discussed in the previous chapter should be considered 
as a starting point. The best economic practices should be taken into consideration, focusing 
also on how those have changed in relation to the particular business environment defined by 
the crisis. Despite the opportunities that arise in hard times, M&A transactions are embedded 
with risks in relation to the entire process. As a consequence, a well-prepared acquisition 
strategy, good execution, and integration phase contribute to increasing the value creation 
potential.  
The acquisition process is in line with the general steps included in the first chapter. The process 
previously discussed is recalled in its main steps to underline peculiarities that characterize 
uncertain periods and contribute to increasing the probability of success.  
The strategic planning phase of the deal should be elaborated carefully; more than ever in a 
downturn scenario only a clear strategy enables the company to grow and survive through 
acquisitions. The proper structure and tool to support the M&A strategy should already be 
present and the acquisition plan should be revised in connection to the deal strategy set to react 
to the period of uncertainty.  
Focusing on the pre-purchase phase, the target screening may generate opportunities for 
acquirers. They have the possibility to exploit the increased availability of firms connected to 
 54 
those companies that become sellers for the bad consequences on their business generated by 
the critical time. Companies that were not available for sale become potential targets. As a 
consequence, the opportunity to select the best fit increases in downturns with the availability 
of a greater supply of targets. 
The process goes on with the target screening, valuation, and due diligence. Not surprisingly, 
the higher difficulty of risk assessment makes those steps more complicated. The fair value and 
synergy potential of the seller become harder to assess when the crises have a major impact on 
the P&L, and when the uncertainty about the expected value of the target performance and 
cash-flow rises. This leads to difficulties in setting a proper premium, increasing the chances 
of offering a multiple not in line with the seller valuation. This misalignment between parties 
may generate longer negation phases. However, during a downturn the opportunity to buy at 
lower prices increases and valuation multiples tend to fall (Gatti and Chiarella, 2012). As a 
consequence, the investment is less risky when the buyer is able to buy at a lower price. 
Moreover, lower valuations for targets improve the chances for acquirers to see higher returns 
(PWC, 2019). In light of these considerations, due diligence and the target valuation, result to 
be again fundamental steps in order to unfold success. 
The post-purchase phase is challenged by the uncertain situation. The more the future scenario 
is unclear the harder it will be proceeding with the integration phase. But when due diligence 
has been well performed this complex phase is facilitated. Among the most critical elements of 
the integration phase when uncertainty prevails, there are customer focus, employee retention, 
communication relevance, and process speed. It has proven that customers have not a good 
opinion about M&A, perceiving to not benefit from those transactions (Ficery et al., 2009). In 
crisis scenarios customer retention can be a real challenge. Customers themselves are facing 
difficulties connected to the recession, thus an active attitude toward customer retention should 
be an imperative. The focus should be on maintaining a high-quality customer experience and 
a deep understanding of customers’ needs and preferences, anticipating changes in the buying 
patterns. Customer engagement should be maintained through well deployed communication.  
Another dimension a company should focus on is the workforce. Employees are nervous, 
stressed and anxious for the situation and managers should focus on keeping them motivated. 
As a consequence, the human dimension increases in complexity when two firms are integrating 
into one reality.  Moreover, cutting costs through employee reduction can jeopardize the 
recovery if it is not properly done (PWC, 2020). Revising workforce structure during hard times 
is necessary but the retention of talented and skilled employees is a key for value creation in 
the long run. In dealing with the workforce, timely and properly done communication results 
again to be fundamental. Good communication should be embedded during all the integration 
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process and its importance increases with the rise of uncertainty. Finally, the faster the 
integration process is done, the sooner synergies can be realized. Well execution and speed are 
the integration phase fundamental ingredients for value creation in downturns. 
During difficult economic times both threats and opportunities arise. Those should be explored 
to unfold success. However, the window for maximizing value is relatively short considering 
what has been learned from past recessions (Salsberg, 2020). Valuations that decline during a 
downturn are likely to recover quickly when the situation starts to restore, the same occurs with 
the target availability and the potential to buy at lower prices, paying a lower premium. Thus, 
another variable always mentioned in business comes into play: time. Timing is really important 
in downturns when the tendency would be being conservative, action is called for assisting 
value creation with a perspective that goes over the short and medium terms (BCG,2019).  
All phases of the M&A process are interconnected and performing a disciplined execution of 
the deal is fundamental for unfold success. Successful acquirers need to understand threats and 
opportunities connected to the external environment in which they operate and move quickly 
with a proactive attitude toward changes. 
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3.3 The Covid-19 Economic Scenario and its Impact on the M&A Market  
 
The most recent spreading of coronavirus and its effects on the global economy have stressed 
more than ever the unpredictability of downturns and the difficulties of facing periods of high 
uncertainty. Companies have been challenged to face an unprecedented scenario that has 
threatened their going-concern status.  
The rapid diffusion of Covid-19 has been a major global challenge. After the outbreak in China 
occurred at the end of December 2019, the virus has rapidly spread causing the declaration of 
a pandemic on March 11, 2020, by the World Health Organization. The virus has caused around 
15 million infections and 600.000 deaths by the end of July (WHO, 2020). Covid-19 has firstly 
led to an unprecedented global health emergency where the national health systems capacity 
has been strained. Beyond the human suffering and deaths connected to the virus spreading, it 
has caused a heavy economic crisis. Governments and organizations have worked for limiting 
the spreading and avoiding the health system to collapse, however policies such as lockdowns 
and social distances had a major impact on the economy. The major economies have been hit 
with different timing and extent by the pandemic shocks, but all experienced a sharp contraction 
in their activity as containment measures were implemented (OECD, 2020). The main effects 
have been the enforced shutdown of companies, reduced working hours, job losses.  These in 
turn had a major negative impact on countries’ output, households’ and companies’ income, 
employment. However, without the promptly introduced policies, the negative effect would 
have been even larger. 
Uncertainty about a recovery is still present, however, positive signs have been registered 
within the businesses reopening and the mitigation of physical distance prescriptions. 
The growth prospect depends on the further outbreaks that may occur around the globe, the 
effectiveness of the measures imposed, and the timing needed for a vaccine or effective 
treatment to be deployed. Measures include both those connected to the public health, such as 
social distancing and masks utilization and fiscal and monetary support actions undertaken to 
assist the economy. 
The analysis of Covid-19 implications would need a separate work, for the purpose of this study 
the economic scenario set by the crisis is explored, within its effects on the M&A market. In 
analyzing the playground set by the crisis, a particular focus will be given to the Italian situation 
in the first semester of 2020 that will be mirrored by an analysis made on a sample of Italian 




3.3.1 Italian Economic Scenario Post Covid-19 Outbreak 
 
After China, Italy has been the first European country to be hit by the Covid-19 spreading since 
the end of February 2020. The daily new infection peak has been reached on March 21st, 2020, 
with around 6000 new cases reported, and the height of the outbreak has been in early April. 
The virus has first hit the northern regions, about the more productive Italian areas, then 
spreading nationwide.  
Since then, the government has worked on contentive measures with the aim to limit the virus 
diffusion. The Italian response has been quick, first stopping the flight from China at the end 
of January, then imposing movement restrictions, closing schools and universities and non-
essential businesses. In April, within the decreasing number of newly infected patients, those 
restrictive measures have started to be released gradually, maintaining some social distancing 
and public health restrictions. Within June, Italy has allowed the tourist flow from other 
European countries. Those contentive measures, undoubtedly necessary to contain the 
spreading, had an important effect on the Italian economy, influencing production, investment, 
and consumption. As a consequence, high uncertainty, weak confidence, and employment 
decline have characterized the economic scenario since the virus outbreak, leading both the real 
and financial economy to a deep contraction.  
Starting from the macroeconomic impact, the Italian GDP fell by 5,3% in the first quarter of 
2020 and according to the national statistical office, ISTAT, a strong contraction by -8.3% is 
forecasted for the end of 2020, followed by a recovery by +4.6% in 2021, in line with the main 
forecasts (e.g. Banca d’Italia). This trend is the result of multiple factors. First of all, the drop 
is due to the fall in domestic demand. The household and NPISH (Non-profit institutions 
serving households) consumption is expected to decrease by -8.7% in 2020 with investments 
drop by -12,5%. Also the suspension of economic activities and the consequent impact on jobs 
and households’ and company’s income have played a major role in output. Moreover, the 
global spreading has also disrupted the international trade, leading to a dramatic fall of the 
foreign demand for Italian goods. Banca d’Italia has estimated a foreign demand decrease by -
13,5% (Banca d’Italia, 2020). Finally, the lockdown, social distancing measures, and travel 
restrictions have hit one of the most important Italian sectors: tourism, that in 2019 has 
accounted for 5% of the Italian GDP (Banca d’Italia, 2019).   
The same downward trend has been registered for the employment rate, a sharp decrease by -
9,3% is overseen with an expected recovery in 2021 (+4.1%).  
It has to be stressed that the uncertainty about the duration, strength, and geographical spreading 
of the pandemic makes projections difficult to be formulated. Those have been based on the 
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available statistical information and forecast models, assuming that the spread of the pandemic 
remains under control at a global and national level. Nonetheless, a revision is expected with 
the collection of more data. Moreover, if a new serious outbreak occurs forecasts would be 
more negative: the GDP could decrease by more than 13 % with a moderate recovery in 2021 
and 2022 (Banca d’Italia, 2020). 
Despite the overall GDP drop, a slow recovery has started in the second quarter of the year, 
from May onwards, in conjunction with the decrease of the infected new cases and the gradual 
release of the containment measures. However, the sharp fell in industrial and service activity 
in the first quarter still brings its negative effects.  
Industrial production has declined in April by 19.1%, beginning to recover in May and June 
when it rose by around 40% compared to the previous month (Istat, 2020). However, despite 
the macroeconomic impact of the pandemic on the Italian scenario, the crisis has hit the 
industrial network in an inhomogeneous way. The closing of businesses following the 
government’s contentive policies have hit more the micro and small enterprises, that are 
particularly important for the Italian economy both in terms of employment and contribution to 
the total output. The impact on revenues has been disastrous for all firms, however micro and 
small companies have reported the worst loss that overcomes 50% for micro firms and it has 
been reported around 48,5% for small companies. Among the medium and large companies, 
the impact has been important but milder, those firms have reported a loss that most frequently 
ranges from 10 to 50 percent (Istat, 2020). 
The decrease in demand has been the most significant side effect of Covid-19 among all sectors, 
however some sectors have been hit more intensively. The graph below synthesized the 
estimated impact on consumption value by sector on the basis of Confcommercio data. The 
degree of intensity with which different sectors have been hit depends on the scenario defined 
by the crisis. Lockdown and social distancing have impacted less the essential businesses such 
as food, beverages and healthcare. Those sectors have been also less impacted by the customers’ 
purchase power decrease connected to the negative impact on companies’ and households’ 
income. On the other hand, among the most impacted sectors hotel and catering, entertainment, 
culture and education have been most affected by the contentive measures such as lockdown, 
social distancing, and travel limitations. The different crisis impacts among the various sectors 




Graph 2: Absolute variation Italian consumption by sector. Source: Confcommercio-Imprese per l'Italia 
 
Another dimension impacted by the crisis has been the financial market. Share prices started to 
lose value in the most acute phases of the pandemic, with investors less risk prone. A recovery 
has started in April when investors’ confidence has improved, encouraged by the expansionary 
measures introduced by the monetary and fiscal authorities (Banca d’Italia, 2020). As a 
consequence, share prices have started to rise both in Italy and in the Euro area.  A market 
decline in equity risk premiums has benefited market valuations, leading also to a reduction of 
companies’ funding costs. Secondly, market yields on bonds issued by non-financial 
corporations and banks have fallen respectively by 86 and 131 basis points (Banca d’Italia, 
2020). Moreover, the bond issuance by non-financial corporations has been encouraged by the 
Eurosystem purchase of those instruments other than lower funding costs. Despite the recovery, 
the financial market remains highly sensitive to news about the virus spreading.  
All the environmental dimensions have been impacted by the pandemic crisis, in such a 
situation, all companies have been called to act trying to react to the crisis.  Nevertheless, every 
cloud has a silver lining, crises make emerging weaknesses, giving space for companies to 
improve and unlock hidden or new opportunities. Covid-19 has also brought and reinforced 
trends in the economic scenario, such as digitalization and sustainability.  Firms have to develop 
strategies to retain or improve their position in the market, according to the playground defined 
by the crisis. Those are called to put on the table their strengths and exploit new opportunities 
as levers for reaction.  Leading in a crisis is never easy, but hard times leave the most indelible 
imprints on a company’s identity (Schaninger et al., 2020). 
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3.3.2 M&A Activity During the Pandemic 
 
The scenario set by the pandemic crisis does not seem a fertile ground for mergers and 
acquisitions. All the environmental factors that contribute to boosting deal volume and value 
have been negatively impacted by the virus spreading. However, as we have seen, opportunities 
for successful and value creating deals are present also in situations where the main economic 
indicators are negatively impacted. The role of M&A and the success imperatives have been 
discussed, the following part explores some aspects related to how Covid-19 in particular has 
shaped the deal activity. In fact, the health and economic crisis has brought some peculiarities 
both at the macro and micro level, that is worth adding to the general prescriptions previously 
defined when dealing with downturns. 
Output, employment, stock market, demand have been negatively impacted by the crisis 
generating effects also on the M&A activity. A decrease in M&A volume and value has been 
registered at the European level compared with the 2019 figures, as we would expect during 
downturns. However, the data show that enthusiasm has not been lost and deals have closed 
despite the situation. In the first semester of 2020 European M&A totaled €563 billion, keeping 
pace with 2019 figures when M&A yearly value was recorded around € 1.060 billion 
(Pitchbook, 2020). However, those data may be impacted by the deals announced or 
programmed before the pandemic outbreak. Even if the deal volume leads to good expectations 
for the M&A activity in the next quarters of 2020, the uncertainty connected to future serious 
Covid-19 outbreaks may revisit the more positive projections.  
The pandemic seems to have been at the same time a breaker and accelerator of the deal 
activities. Deals are held back by the macroeconomic drivers negatively impacted by the crisis, 
such as the decrease of aggregate demand, the stock market lag, and the real economy 
slowdown. But at the same time M&A activity is pushed by low interest rates and trends 
reinforced by the crisis, such as the need of technological innovation and the stimulus toward a 
more sustainable innovation. Acquisitions in this context have the potential to drive the change 
needed, being the corporate means to quickly gain the required competencies and know-how to 
face the new and reinforced drivers. The need for a technological shift is embedded in the 
totality of the supply chain that requires to be fortified looking at flexibility: from the need of 
having a shorter and more flexible supply chain to the relationship with customers. As we have 
mentioned, customer focus is of fundamental importance during critical times, and when 
measures imply social distances that physically limit contacts, other means of virtual 
connections gain fundamental importance. In addition to mutated customer relationships, 
businesses have also to face the challenge related to the employees’ safety. Other than working 
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remotely, workforce creative solutions have been fundamental to enable companies to continue 
their operations, also in this case digitalization has a fundamental role. Technological 
innovation helps companies to build more flexible organizations, whose pandemic has stressed 
the relevance. The needed shift has the potential to boost deal activity.  
M&A activity in the Covid-19 context can be a lever for opportunities exploitations. 
Nevertheless, not all companies are able to turn a distressed scenario into an opportunity space: 
financial stability, proactive attitude and bold strategic decision making are required.  
Some companies will not be able to include M&A deals in their strategic plan for the disastrous 
effects of the pandemic on their business. However, the inorganic growth opportunities are still 
on the strategic agenda of companies operating in sectors less impacted by Covid-19 and with 
a strong balance sheet. A study of the M&A leadership council, involving 50 C-level executives 
has explored the expectations about the deal activities of these professionals (Herndon and 
Bennder, 2020). The majority of respondents have indicated that a temporary pause of deal 
activity was contemplated, waiting to understand the nature and timing of the recovery (51%). 
A further 14% have declared the interruption of the ongoing deals. However, others have 
expressed their intention to pursue M&A deals (24%), responding that no changes in 2020 
volume were expected. These percentages demonstrate how a large part of companies tends to 
stop external growth programs in hard times, working more on survival actions rather than 
proactive attitudes. This trend leads to a general M&A activity slowdown. Nonetheless, there 
is a substantial part ready to face the challenges of M&A transactions, exploiting the 
opportunity spaces that a distressed scenario brings to the market. 
Other than leading to a general decrease in M&A volume and value, the negative impact on 
companies’ revenues, uncertainty, and job losses have generated operating challenges for 
companies performing M&A deals. The deal structure has been inevitably shaped by the 
situation, generating new necessities, redefining the rules of the game, and requiring creative 
strategic thinking to overcome the difficulties.  
With the outbreak of the Covid-19 crisis a focus has been given to valuation, one of the key 
steps of the M&A process for value creation.  It has been stressed how uncertainty about future 
conditions and high volatility make valuation difficult to be done. In the coronavirus scenario 
the future recovery is still uncertain, the forecasts of the main economic indicators are not 
totally reliable. As a consequence, multiple scenarios are elaborated for macro-indicators 
projections as future sudden outbreaks could happen and worsen the more positive expectations. 
In this situation assessing the fair value of companies has raised concerns. Without a reliable 
forecast, business plan projection is difficult to assess, thus valuation both through multiples 
and discounted cash flow becomes challenging. Moreover, higher volatility leads on one hand 
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to higher discount rates, thus lower companies’ valuations; on the other, to uncertainty about 
the risk and return of the acquirer.  As valuation becomes more difficult to assess, buyers try to 
push down prices on the basis of the Covid-19 impact on the target business. Targets instead 
attempt to negotiate a higher valuation considering the crisis’s negative impact as temporary or 
applicable to the entire sector rather than to their specific company. This mismatch among 
parties deletes the negotiation phase and the process timing. In order to avoid significant 
undervaluation or overvaluation, the companies should utilize valuation ranges, sensitivity 
analysis and scenario analysis, coupled with a continuous monitoring of macro-economic 
assumptions to ensure their relevance (KPMG, 2020). The uncertainty related to the target 
valuation has led the acquirers to utilize more earn-outs and deferred consideration/vendor 
loans, seeking a lower short-term impact on cash flow and to ensure the participation of the 
seller in the future business performance (Deloitte, 2020). These solutions have contributed to 
bridging the price gap between sellers and buyers, in this context consideration transferred 
creativity has been required to overcome this valuation mismatch.  
Within the complex valuation process, also due diligence has been impacted. As we have seen, 
it includes the inspection of the target company to identify potential risks and liabilities, and it 
is based on the company’s data and their projections. Available quantitative and qualitative 
information about the target company results less reliable in the scenario set by the crisis and 
subjectivity about the forecasts of the main financial indicators has increased. Buyers are 
expected to utilize a more diligent approach, increasing the dialogue with the seller; while 
targets should expect a higher level of scrutiny. In this context, due diligence is of critical 
importance, a deep analysis should be done at the financial, operational, and legal levels. 
Moreover, both buyers and sellers should include the impact of the crisis in the respective due 
diligence, considering also the effects of an eventual further spreading of the virus. 
Due diligence traditionally also includes site inspections and management meetings. Those 
activities have been particularly affected by the social distancing, lockdown, and business 
closure measures, challenging companies to execute M&A remotely. Other than the already 
existent data room the counterparties had to rely more on digital instruments both in dealing 
with the advisors and with the target company. Virtual meetings and virtual visits to the seller 
facility have led the due diligence process during the lockdown. While the more traditional face 
to face approach has come back especially for domestic transactions with the release of 
contentive measures, cross-border deals are still highly based on those practices. The 
digitalization trend brought by the pandemic has also impacted the M&A process. 
The deal risks intensification has strengthened the protection that acquirers seek within the 
purchase and share agreements. It is expected an increased use of clauses, warranties, and 
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closing conditions to protect buyers from Covid-19 related uncertainties and to ensure the 
content of what has been actually bought. As a consequence, deals in the negotiation phase 
during the pandemic outbreak have seen a delay in their closing dates for the necessity of 
conforming the transaction to the mutated circumstances. Some deals have also been canceled 
in connection to the inability of companies to come to a mutual agreement for the economic 
changes brought by Covid-19. 
Despite the environment and new challenges, according to a McKinsey analysis, the companies 
that more likely will emerge stronger from the Covid-19 crisis are those able to quickly adapt 
to the situation and develop M&A activities before the next normal arrives (Giersberg et al., 
2020). M&A are tools in the hands of resilient companies to keep up with times and outperform 
competitors even during critical economic conditions, as those delineated by Covid-19.  
The fourth chapter follows with an analysis that aims to understand how Covid-19 has shaped 
the Italian M&A activity considering a sample of Italian listed companies. 
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4 Covid-19 Implications on the Italian Deal Activity  
 
This chapter aims at exploring the short-term effects of the pandemic on the Italian M&A 
activity. The period under analysis starts with the Covid-19 outbreak in Italy in February 2020 
and ends with August 2020 that has been elected as the closing date for the data collection. The 
analysis has been conducted on a sample of public Italian companies that have been selected 
according to a series of empirical and theoretical aspects as well as data availability.  Four 
research questions have been developed to explore four different aspects of M&A deals 
undertaken during the seven months under study. 
 
1. What have been the value creation implications for the acquirer companies? 
1.1 Has the transaction announcement generated positive abnormal returns for the 
acquiring company shareholders? 
1.2 How critical success factors have impacted value creation in our sample? 
 
The first research question has been addressed in paragraph 4.2 and explores the value creation 
implications of M&A activity in our sample. The acquirer shareholders’ abnormal returns will 
be used as a proxy for M&A profitability to understand if transactions conducted during the 
Covid-19 pandemic by Italian listed companies have generated value for the acquirers. Value 
creation is driven by some factors that contribute to explain the higher or lower level of 
profitability among acquirers, thus another aspect of value creation is explored. Four 
determinants of M&A success discussed in theory are tested on the sample of transactions 
undertaken during the Covid-19 crisis to explore if those apply to the deals under analysis and 
to what extent define the different levels of profitability registered among acquiring firms. 
 
2. Have the more active companies in the M&A market been less impacted by the Covid-19 
crisis, thus are they more financially strong than those that have not performed any deal? 
 
The second research question has been addressed in paragraph 4.3. The relationship between 
company financials and the propensity of making a deal is examined. Literature and empirics 
often cite financial strength as a prerequisite for making M&A transactions during critical 
times. This section wants to test this condition for the sample under study.  
 




3.  Which sectors have been more active in the M&A market between the timeframe of 
February 2020 and August 2020?  
 
In paragraph 4.4 the M&A activity among different sectors is explored. The Covid-19 pandemic 
crisis has hit the economy with different intensity among sectors, M&A deals are expected to 
be on the agenda of the less impacted businesses and those belonging to non-cyclical sectors. 
The study aims to understand which sectors have been more active, performing deals despite 
critical times.  
 
4. What have been the main motives that have pushed companies to start a negotiation? 
 
Finally, section 4.5 explores the rationale behind the deals in our sample. Different motivations 
push companies to negotiate, we want to see if a common pattern can be noticed among the 
motives that move companies to perform a deal in a distressed environment. 
 
After describing the main database, the research questions are analyzed and discussed. 
The first two research questions addressed in sections 4.2 and 4.3 are explored with a statistical 
approach, thus each part includes subparagraphs that specify the sample, the methodology 
utilized, and results. Discussion and conclusions are also treated separately for the two research 
questions. The last two paragraphs instead are characterized by a simpler structure where 
sample, results, comments, and conclusions are included in the same paragraph. 
 
4.1 Database Construction 
 
We have included in the main database the listed Italian companies with market capitalization 
> 50 million €.  Nano companies have been included in the database but for the poor availability 
of financial data have been excluded from the analysis. Each company has been categorized 
according to the super sector made by Borsa Italiana. Following this categorization firms under 
the super sector “Bank”, “Financial service” and “Insurance” have been excluded (Financial 
sector). This choice is connected to the fact that some theoretical aspects treated along the work 
not always specifically refer to the financial sector, moreover performance indicators used in 
the analysis do not apply to this sector (e.g., Revenues and EBITDA). 
Following these criteria, the companies selected are 166. 
The Database includes the following information for each company: 
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- Market capitalization (Borsa Italiana) 
- Industry (Pitchbook) 
- Super sector (Borsa Italiana) 
- Number of companies in the group (AIDA Database) 
Basic financial information when available has been included (86 companies). The focus has 
been on the economic results of the companies under analysis and in particular Revenues and 
Ebitda. If disclosed in the company website, the database covers: 
- 1 semester 2019 Revenues 
- 1 semester 2020 Revenues 
- 1 semester 2019 Ebitda 
- 1 semester 2020 Ebitda 
 
A screening of the price sensitive information disclosed by the firms has been done to analyze 
their deal activity in the period under study. The following information has been included:  
- Occurrence of M&A transactions (yes/no) between February 2020 and August 2020 
when a transaction has occurred, more details have been added to the database (80 transactions):  
- Announcement Period  
- State of the deal (closed/announced) 
- Target Name 
- % acquisition stake  
- Main acquisition motive 
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4.2 Value Creation Implications on M&A Deal Activity During Covid-19 
 
The value creation potential of M&A transactions is still under debate. Different business fields 
have tried to explore this matter, using different methods but failing to come to a comprehensive 
conclusion. The difficulties in coming to a universal framework explaining M&A success have 
origins in what has been defined as performance and the methods used to measure it, other than 
the complexity surrounding those deals. In the second chapter, this aspect of M&A literature 
and research has been explored within the main methods used to analyze performance and the 
factors that seem to contribute the most to the deals’ success.  
The first research question seeks to explore the value creation implications on the M&A activity 
of the Covid-19 surge. 
Firstly, the value creation potential connected to the transactions included in our sample wants 
to be measured and quantified. In light of what has been discussed in the second part of the 
work, when M&A value creation is measured, it is important to clearly set the time frame under 
analysis and define the performance construct to explore. The pandemic crisis and the related 
uncertainty are still affecting the market and its recent outbreak does not allow to consider a 
medium- or long-term spectrum.  As a consequence, the short-term perspective is taken into 
consideration as the only possible path, also in connection to the data availability. For what 
concerns the definition of value creation, the analysis focuses on the gains of the acquirers’ 
shareholders. Despite M&A transactions move different economic interests from those of 
managers, employees, suppliers and customers to governments and communities, reflecting the 
multidimensionality construct; it is assumed that shareholders’ interests are the benchmark for 
the business activity, as they provide resources to the firm and share the risk of failure. The 
choice of considering the acquirer’s shareholders return firstly confirms the approach taken in 
the entire work, based on the analysis of M&A transactions with the acquirer perspective. 
Secondly, this market measure enables us to explore the value creation implications of M&A 
activity in spite of the constraint of financial data availability related to the financial and 
economic performance of the firms included in the sample. Finally, considering returns to 
shareholders has also the twofold advantage of being a direct measure of investors’ value 
creation and of being a forward-looking measure, as stock prices represent the expected value 
of future cash flow (Bruner, 2004).  
In light of these considerations, the sample of companies is analyzed to understand the 
acquirers’ shareholders value creation implication of M&A activity during the Covid-19 crisis. 
The research approach that combines a short-term perspective and the focus on the shareholders 
returns is the event study methodology. This methodology has been already described in general 
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terms in the second chapter and it will be utilized in our study to explore whether M&A 
transactions have impacted the financial performance (positively or negatively) of the acquiring 
companies. Thus, how those deals have influenced the investors’ behavior when the M&A 
transaction was announced during the pandemic crisis. 
Many researchers have examined the stock market response to M&A announcements and it 
appears clear how those transactions tend to generate positive average abnormal returns to the 
target shareholder, whereas small positive abnormal returns are registered for acquirers, 
sometimes even negative or not statistically significant (Agrawal and Jaffe; 1999, Bruner; 2004; 
Tuch and O’Sullivan, 2007). The particular scenario defined by the Covid-19 pandemic makes 
it interesting to understand the impact of those transactions on shareholders’ wealth. A positive 
shareholder value creation, thus a positive market reaction is expected, as external growth is a 
demonstration of proactive attitude and resiliency during critical times. As a consequence, the 
fourth research question has been analyzed formulating a main hypothesis: 
 
H1: The announcement of M&A transactions during the covid-19 crisis has generated positive 
abnormal returns to acquirers ‘shareholders among the companies in our sample.  
 
The empirical studies mentioned in the third chapter, demonstrate the potential of M&A 
activities to generate higher returns for acquirers during critical times (e.g. Gatti and Chiarella, 
2012; PWC, 2019; BCG, 2019), the projection of a positive market effect rely also on those 
studies. Moreover, the opportunity spaces that generate in downturns for acquirers, such as 
increased availability of firms and lower valuation multiples, strengthen this belief.  
Other than qualify and quantify M&A profitability, the work explores another aspect of value 
creation. As stressed, empirical evidence shows contrasting results about profitability among 
acquiring firms, those are explained by factors that drive success and define higher or lower 
levels of profitability. Some of the success determinants that have been described in the second 
chapter are tested in our sample, to understand if those have contributed to determining 
shareholder value creation differentials. 
After describing the specific sample taken into consideration for the analysis and the 









The original dataset composed by 166 companies and 80 M&A transactions has been the 
starting point for the sample construction. The database has been enriched for conducting the 
analysis with the use of the Eikon database.  
The elements added include: 
- announcement date 
- the historical daily stock prices for one trading year before the announcement date 
- the indexes in which each company is included 
- the historical daily prices for the indexes  
Those elements enable us to perform the event study. In order to further explore the value 
creation determinants other information has been included:  
- Number of previous acquisitions performed by the acquiring company between 2018 
and 2020 
- Acquirers’ 2019 Revenues 
- Targets’ 2019 Revenues  
- The nature of the transaction in terms of regional focus: Cross Border vs Domestic 
Transactions. 
 
The deals that have been included are those announced between February 2020 and August 
2020, as a consequence from the 80 transactions covered in the main dataset, the final sample 
utilized in this analysis counts 51 deals. 25 deals have been announced prior to the period under 
study.  Moreover, four deals have been excluded from the sample for the unavailability of the 
stock price performance. The related acquiring firms (N=4) became public less than one trading 
year before the transaction announcement, thus not enough data was available to conduct the 
analysis through the event study methodology. 
 
4.2.2 Event Study Methodology  
 
As previously stated, the method chosen to conduct this analysis is the event study 
methodology, originally introduced by Fama, Fisher and Roll in 1969. Event studies are 
designed to measure the impact of particular types of firm-specific events on the prices of the 
affected firms’ securities (Brown and Warner, 1980). In our study the event considered is the 
announcement of an M&A transaction, thus the methodology enables to examine the abnormal 
returns to shareholders in the period surrounding the deal announcement.  The abnormal return 
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is computed as the difference between the actual return observed on the stock market on the 
date around the event, and the anticipated return that would have been expected without the 
occurrence of the event (MacKinley, 1997). The basic idea under event studies is that when an 
M&A deal is announced the company price will change to reflect how much value the market 
believes the deal will create.  
The first step of the event study method involves the identification of the event date and the 
definition of two-time frames necessary to conduct the study: the estimation window and the 
event window. The estimation window is set in order to determine the “normal” behavior of the 
stock price, in our study it is composed of 252 trading days (1 calendar year) prior to the event 
announcement. Previous researches use various time windows, there is not a standard length, 
however a minimum of 126 observations (half year) is suggested in order to obtain robust 
results (Benninga, 2014). Moreover, the estimation window should not overlap with the event 
window as the studied event should not influence the “normality” of the estimation window 
(MacKinlay, 1997). If the event window is included in the estimation of the normal model 
parameters, the event returns would have an influence on the normal measure. In practice the 
estimation window is selected to determine what the firm stock’s returns would have been in 
the absence of the event. 
The short-term perspective of our study is reflected in the choice of the event window, which 
corresponds to the period of time in which we are interested to explore the effect of the event. 
The main event window is set at 11 days; five days prior to the announcement and five days 
after the announcement have been considered, including the announcement day [-5,+5].  
Additionally, the study has been conducted also considering the time window [-10,+10], thus 
including 21 trading days around the announcement, and the announcement day itself [0]. A 
benefit of choosing a short time horizon is the reduced risk that other events impact the analysis 
(Lubatkin, 1987). Confounding events makes the analysis and related conclusions less 
significant, as other phenomena may impact the results.  Moreover, a relatively short-term event 
window makes test statistics more powerful (Brown and Warner, 1985).  
By including some days prior to the acquisition announcement possible information leakage 
that may occur prior the event, or any anticipation of the deal is taken into consideration. Only 
if the event is unexpected does the stock’s price fully reflects the information at the 
announcement. Whereas taking into consideration some days after the announcement allows to 
reflect the time that the market may need to digest the information and act consequently. In 
fact, if abnormal returns persist after the event date the results are inconsistent with the market 
efficiency theory (Kotari and Warner, 2006). In this sense, event studies are a way to test the 
market efficient hypothesis. The event period [-10, +10] has been included to better control for 
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these effects, covering 10 days prior and 10 days after the announcement period. As a 
consequence, the time frames [-5,-1], [+1,+5], [-10,-1] and [+1,+10] are taken into 
consideration to test the market efficiency assumption embedded in these kinds of studies.  
For any transactions, the company’ daily stock prices have been collected from the Eikon 
database for the estimation windows [-257, -6] and [-262, -11] (252 trading days). To compute 
the actual return of stock i at time t the following formula has been used: 
 
Ri,t = (P t / P t-1) -1 
Where:  
- P t is the closing stock price at time t  
- P t-1 is the closing stock price at time t-1 
 
Then, the expected returns are obtained using the market model, those will be deducted from 
the observed actual returns to obtain the abnormal return.  The market model relates the return 
of any given security to the return of the market portfolio, in practice a market index is used as 
a proxy for the market portfolio (MacKinley, 1997). In this study Borsa Italiana indexes have 
been used as a proxy of the market portfolio. The indexes taken into consideration have been 
FTSE MIB, FTSE AIM, FTSE small cap and FTSE mid cap. The choice to rely on more indexes 
has been done to better reflect the market expectation about the returns of the stocks taken into 
consideration. For any security i the expected return 𝐸(R) at time t has been calculated as:  
 
𝐸(Ri, t) = D𝑖 + E𝑖 ∗ 𝑅𝑚, 𝑡 
Where: 
- Ri,t is the period t return of the security i 
- Rm,t is the period t return of the market index 
- Di and Ei are the parameters of the market model estimated running an OLS regression 
of the firm’s daily returns during the estimation window (252 trading days). D 
incorporates the stock i general performance track record and it is the model intercept, 
while E represents the stock sensitivity to general market movements. 
 
The abnormal return AR for security i at time t is then computed by taking the difference 
between the observed actual return and the expected return on a given day, for a given security. 
  
𝐴𝑅𝑖, 𝑡 = 𝑅𝑖, 𝑡 − 𝐸(𝑅𝑖, 𝑡) 
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The abnormal return is a direct measure of the change in shareholder wealth after the event 
announcement (Kothari and Warner, 2006). It has been computed for all firms and events in 
the sample for every event window taken into consideration.  
Then, the cumulative abnormal returns have been computed to better measure the total impact 
of the announcement of an M&A deal in our sample. Those are the sum of the abnormal 
returns within an event window that goes from t1 to t2, thus representing the return earned over 
and above what would be earned under ordinary market conditions. This measure allows to 
aggregate the abnormal returns obtained for each observation through the time dimension, 
enabling to express the value creation for a certain time window. In our study the main event 
window is of 11 days, thus for example the corresponding CAR relative to the observation i 
will be CARi (-5,+5). 
 





To better reflect the general effect of M&A announcement on shareholders returns for the entire 
sample of transactions, the average abnormal return and the cumulative average abnormal 
return have been computed for the sample. Those measures enable to aggregate the computed 
AR and CAR both across securities (or firms) and time, in this way it is possible to draw overall 
















After the calculation of the above mentioned measures, the main hypothesis is constructed. As 
mentioned, the research question is answered through a main hypothesis: 
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H1: The announcement of M&A transactions during the Covid-19 crisis has generated positive 
abnormal returns to acquirers’ shareholders among the companies in our sample. 
  
This will be empirically tested through the determination of a null hypothesis: 
 
H0: The computed CARs for the time windows under analysis are statistically different from 
0. 
 
In order to test the statistical significance of the computed measures both a parametric standard 
t-test and a non-parametric Wilcoxon signed rank test (see Wilcoxon, 1945) have been 
conducted (Brown and Warner; 1985). The latter, in comparison with the t-test, does not assume 
the normality of the abnormal returns’ distributions. 
 
The mentioned analysis has been also performed dividing the overall sample into two 
subsamples according to some factors connected to those discussed in chapter two as elements 
influencing M&A success: 
- Relative size 
- Previous deal experience  
- Regional focus: cross border vs domestic transactions 
- Control triggering acquisition vs minority interest acquisitions  
 
This has been done to test the extent to which those success factors impact the acquirer 
shareholders value creation. It has to be stressed that a Wilcoxon rank sum test (as known as 
Mann Whitney U test) has been performed to test whether the differences of the average CAR 
between the various subsamples are statistically different from zero.  
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4.2.3 Empirical Analysis Results 
 
In this part of the work the main results obtained are described and discussed. Firstly, the main 
sample is under study then the focus moves to the subsamples.  
 
4.2.3.1 Main Sample Results  
 
Starting with an individual approach, the abnormal returns related to the M&A transactions 
announced between February 2020 and August 2020 have been computed for each observation 
in the sample (N=51), for every day in the main estimation window [-5,+5], and for the event 
period [-10,+10]. When companies had performed more than one deal, those have been 
screened in order to make sure that the events were not overlapping in a single event window. 
This problem has not occurred for any firm announcing more than one M&A deal. 
Focusing on the effect at the announcement date, the market had both positive and negative 
reactions, this appears clear in the corresponding graph (graph 3).  
 
 
Graph 3: AR at announcement date [0] 
 
A mixed market reaction has occurred. Among the sample, 61,8% (N=31) of deals have 
generated a positive effect at announcement date with a maximum of 11,04% abnormal return 
recorded and a minimum of 0,15%. Whereas 39,2% (N=20) of transactions had a negative 
market impact, with the lowest abnormal return recorded at -3,70%. 
However, to better represent the overall results in our analysis, a time and securities aggregate 












AR at announcement date [0] for the sample of 51 transactions
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The Cumulative average abnormal returns for the time windows [-5,+5] and [-10,+10] are 
represented respectively in graphs 4 and 5.  
 
 
Graph 4: CAAR event window [-5,+5] 
 
 
Graph 5: CAAR event window [-10,+10] 
 
The market results to have reacted prior the announcement date. By considering both event 
windows a variation in abnormal returns can be observed with a swinging pattern already from 
10 days prior the event.  However, important movements are observed starting from day -5. 
Moreover, from one day before the announcement, the investors seem to have rapidly reacted 
to the event until the announcement day. After it, no important additional response can be 
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The observed CAARs show how on average the market reaction has been positive around the 
announcement date but some information leakage and late reaction may have occurred in our 
sample, with the main market movements registered in the event window [-5,+5]. This makes 
even more important including pre event and post event windows in our analysis. 
Cumulative abnormal returns for every event window analyzed is represented in table 5 within 
some descriptive statistics and the corresponding level of statistical significance, obtained with 















  All transactions N=51  
[-5,+5] 1,31% -19,00% 26,00% 1,070 0,339 
[-10,+10] 0,21% -33,87% 23,96% 0,128 0,779 
[0] 0,90% -14,00% 17,00% 1,727* 0,234 
[-5,-1] 0,21% -4,00% 11,00% 0,267 0,771 
[+1,+5] 0,61% -14,00% 13,00% 0,802 0,245 
[-10,-1] -0,26% -21,95% -18,91% -0,332 0,756 
[+1,+10] -0,22% -19,87% 12,49% -0,267 ,814 
*Statistically significant at 10% level 
**Statistically significant at 5% level 
***Statistically significant at 1% level 
 
Table 5: Event study results for the overall sample. 
 
The event appears to have caused on average a positive market reaction both in the [-5,+5]  and 
[-10,+10] event windows and at the event day [0], with the generation of 1,31%, 0,21%, and 
0,9% cumulative abnormal returns respectively.  
Despite the announcement of M&A transactions appears to generate positive additional wealth 
for shareholders, the results are not statistically significant for any event windows, except for 
the event day [0]. Focusing on the announcement day, the CAR result statistically significant 
according to the parametric t-test at a 10% level (t-statistics=1,727 > 1,68; when df=50, where 
df=N-1). This result would mean that on average the companies at announcement gain a 
statistically significant abnormal return of 0,90%, thus generating value creation for the firm 
shareholders. However, the significance is not confirmed by the Wilcoxon signed rank test (p-
value > 0,1). 
In light of these outcomes, the results do not support the null hypothesis. As a consequence, the 
cumulative average abnormal returns are not statistically significant different from zero. Hence, 
the announcement of M&A transactions does not generate statistically significant abnormal 
returns for the acquiring firm shareholders in the sample under analysis.  
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Despite our expectations, the data confirm the result of a conspicuous part of event studies 
conducted in the M&A field. Small positive abnormal returns not statistically significant are 
often recorded for the acquirers’ shareholders. Already in 1986, Roll in a review article 
concludes that the null hypothesis of zero abnormal performance to acquirers should not be 
rejected (Roll, 1986). The outcome obtained in our study is also confirmed by more recent event 
study reviews (Campa and Hernando, 2004; Bruner, 2004). For example, Bruner (2004), 
reviewing 54 event studies, has stressed how 31% of them showed insignificantly positive 
abnormal returns to acquirers’ shareholders (Bruner, 2004).  
Nevertheless, the study outcome reveals an important consideration: M&A are value 
conserving transactions, rather than value creating or destroying deals. Despite the not 
significant results, positive returns have been recorded. Thus, statistically our hypothesis is 
rejected but with the awareness that the results should not be considered as evidence of negative 
impact of M&A transactions on the shareholders’ acquirers value creation.  
In relation to the test of the market efficient hypothesis embedded in the event study 
methodology, the cumulative abnormal returns registered for the event windows [-5,-1] (0,21%) 
and [+1,+5] (0,51%) are on average small and positive, suggesting a possible degree of 
information leakage and late market response effect. Whereas the CAR registered for the 
periods [-10, -1] (-0,26%) and [+1,+10] (-0,22), thus considering more days before and after 
the announcement day, are small and negative. Despite the contrasting results obtained, from 
graphs 4 and 5 it appears that the market reaction to the transaction announcements is more 
clustered in a time frame of 5 days before and 5 days after the announcement day. This would 
suggest that this period better reflects the transactions’ effect on value creation. Nevertheless, 
no CAR is statistically significant; thus, the market efficient hypothesis is not rejected. 
To further understand the overall sample, it has been divided into two groups according to the 
effect at the announcement, positive (positive abnormal return on day 0) or negative (negative 
abnormal return on day 0). The CAAR has been then computed for the two groups separately. 
It is clear that some transactions have generated positive abnormal returns, that are reflected in 




Graph 6: CAAR for positive vs negative M&A announcements. 
 
This distinction moves away from making general conclusions about the M&A activity in the 
sample under study but demonstrates how some transactions do create value for shareholders. 
This makes it interesting to further analyze the main sample in order to understand if some 
factors discussed in the second chapter contribute to the value creation differential observable 
in our data.  
Subsamples have been created on the basis of some success factors that previous literature and 
research describe as determinants of M&A value creation. The results of the analysis are 
discussed below for each factor considered. 
 
4.2.3.2 Relative Size 
 
As mentioned in the second chapter, the relative size of the target, from the acquirer point of 
view, is a variable that seems to impact the performance of the acquiring company (e.g. Burton 
et al., 1982; Seth et al., 2002; Gomes et al., 2013). However, the size effect has a twofold effect. 
On one hand, when the target is relatively larger than the acquirer the synergy potential results 
more exploitable (Asquith et al., 1983; Kusewitt, 1985; Seth, 1990; Bruner, 2002; Tuch et al., 
2007). Moreover, only a certain target size may lead to tangible market reaction, thus the target 
should achieve enough size to have a measurable impact on the stock market. On the other, a 
smaller target seems to make the integration process smoother with reduced complexity and 
costs (Hunt, 1990; Brouthers et al., 1998).  
The relative size of the target company in our sample has been computed by dividing the 2019 
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et al., 1994). The sample has been then split into two groups according to whether the relative 
size was above or below the sample median. The total observations amount to 48 transactions, 
as the revenue data was not publicly available for three private targets.  
The analysis results are reported in table 6. 
 
Table 6: Event study results for smaller and larger targets. 
From the chart results that on average more positive CARs have been registered for the 
acquirers that bought a relatively larger target. However, the CARs are not statistically 
significant for any time window, suggesting that the capital market has not valued this 
information, not confirming the size effect in our sample. Moreover, the differences og the 
average CAR between the two groups is not statistically significant for any time window taken 
into consideration.  We can conclude that the relative target size has not been a determinant 
factor in defining the acquirers’ shareholders value creation in the transaction announced 
between February 2020 to August 2020 by Italian listed companies. 
 
4.2.3.3 Previous Deal Experience  
 
The previous deal experience is another factor that seems to impact to some extent the 
performance of the acquirers. Successfully negotiating and integrating a business combination 







Mean  Min Max 
Small Relative size N=24    
[-5,+5] -0.11% -16.36% 13.22% -0.083 0.775 
[-10,+10] 0.48% -14.25% 16.89% 0.308 0.961 
[0] 0.47% -3.70% 5.00% 1.129 0.230 
[-5,-1] -1.19% -13.67% 5.51% -1.406 0.209 
[+1,+5] 1.03% -10.61% 10.05% 1.085 0.199 
[-10,-1] -0.16% -11.02% 9.12% -0.240 0.855 
[+1,+10] 0.17% -7.01% 10.91% -0.86 0.970 
Large Relative size N=24      
[-5,+5] 2.38% -16.36% 13.22% 1.069 0.391 
[0] 0.94% -3.70% 5.00% 1.290 0.530 
[-10,+10] 0.22% -33.87% 23.96% 0.067 0.767 
[-5,-1] 1.39% -13.67% 5.51% 1.067 0.549 
[+1,+5] 0.04% -10.61% 10.05% 0.034 0.819 
[-10,-1] 0.01% -21.95% 18.19% 0.000 0.793 
[+1,+10] -0.71% -19.87% 12.49% -0.462 0.657 
*Statistically significant at 10% level 
**Statistically significant at 5% level 
***Statistically significant at 1% level 
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is a complex and difficult process. Thus, previous experience can help managers dealing with 
other similar transactions (Burton et al., 1994; Hayward, 2002; Colombo et al., 2007; Rehm et 
al., 2012). However, any acquisition is different from another, thus acquirers should not rely 
too much on experience. In previous studies related to M&A conducted in critical times, the 
experience results to play a marginal role in value creation. Both occasional and experienced 
acquirers have generated positive total returns in a two-year time frame (BCG, 2019). 
To investigate for prior experience effect in the short-term value creation for the bidder 
shareholders, our main sample has been divided into two groups. The subsamples have been 
constructed according to the total number of acquisitions announced in the three years before 
the transaction under analysis. The mean of the number of transactions has been computed 
(mean=6 deals). Companies that have performed M&A deals that exceed the mean value have 
been considered as “experienced buyers”, unless firms have been considered “occasional 
buyers”. According to this classification 21, acquirers have been considered “experienced” 
announcing more than 6 transactions in the last three years, whereas 30 firms have undertaken 
less than 6 deals. Table 7 reports the CAR for the two subsamples. 
 













  Experienced buyers N=21 
[-5,+5] 1.43% -19.38% 26.22% 0.606 0.476 
[0] 0.46% -3.70% 6.91% 0.727 0.794 
[-10,+10] 0.10% -33.87% 23.96% 0.017 0.985 
[-5,-1] 0.39% -13.67% 16.52% 0.803 0.848 
[+1,+5] 1.06% -14.02% 10.05% 0.292 0.224 
[-10,-1] -0.03% -21.95% 18.91% -0.025 0.984 
[+1,+10] -0.34% -9.71% 10.91% -0.319 0.694 
Occasional buyers N=31      
[-5,+5] 1.22% -14.17% 21.38% 1.639 0.530 
[0] 0.84% -3.51% 11.04% 0.325 0.116 
[-10,+10] 0.28% -16.85% 15.14% 0.191 0.736 
[-5,-1] 0.08% -6.75% 15.53% 0.081 0.750 
[+1,+5] 0.30% -13.84% 12.93% 0.939 0.798 
[-10,-1] -0,42% -12.94% 11.98% -0.531 0.602 
[+1,+10] -0.13% -19.87% 12.49% -0.106 0.980 
*Statistically significant at 10% level 
**Statistically significant at 5% level 
***Statistically significant at 1% level 
  
Table 7: Event study results for Experienced buyers and Occasional buyers. 
 
According to literature and previous studies, the accumulated experience should be connected 
to higher shareholder value creation. However, in our sample the recorded CARs are positive 
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for all event windows and for both experienced and occasional acquirers, without important 
differences in values. In line with the BCG study both occasional and experienced acquirers 
create positive cumulative abnormal returns.  However, also the different experience level is 
not connected to statistically significant results. Furthermore, no statistical difference has been 
found between the two groups. In our sample of transactions announced during the Covid-19 
pandemic, the expertise in dealing with M&A transactions has not generated significant extra 
value.   
 
4.2.3.4 Regional Focus  
 
The regional focus of the transaction refers to cross-border versus domestic transactions. In the 
second chapter this factor has not been directly considered as an element explaining M&A 
success; nevertheless, it is connected to different value creating factors discussed.  
Firstly, communication in cross-border situations may need to be handled more carefully since 
cultural differences add an extra degree of difficulty to the process (Schweiger et al., 1993). 
Effective communication and a transparent flow of information among the parties affected by 
the transaction are considered important components of M&A success (Bryson, 2003; Smith 
and Hersman, 1999; Gall, 1991). Moreover, the choice of negotiating in another country 
triggers all the matters related to cultural fit, organizational fit, and strategic fit previously 
discussed. On one hand, the integration process may be more complex when the target has 
different aa culture, different management style, and leadership approach. On the other, 
differences in those terms can also be assets when the different realities improve by learning 
one from the other, coming to best practices. As a consequence, a deal made in a foreign country 
may generate fewer returns to the extent the acquirer is less familiar with the target. 
In our study cumulative abnormal returns have been computed for two subsamples 
distinguished based on the regional focus (cross-border vs domestic transactions). 31 acquirers 
have negotiated with domestic targets, while cross-border deals amounted to 20 transactions. 


























[-5,+5] 0.08% -19.38% 21.38% 0.050 0.852 
[0] 0.25% -3.70% 11.04% 0.480 0.969 
[-10,+10] -0.93% -33.87% 16.89% -0.532 0.737 
[-5,-1] -0.43% -13.67% 15.53% -0.421 0.433 
[+1,+5] 0.59% -14.02% 12.93% 0.551 0.439 
[-10,-1] -1.55% -21.95% 11.98% -1.365 0.213 
[+1,+10] 0.37% -9.71% 12.49% 0.319 0.902 
Cross-Border Transactions 
N=20    
 
 
[-5,+5] 3.21% -7.50% 26.22% 1.77* 0.147 
[0] 1.36% -2.45% 6.91% 2.364** 0.059* 
[-10,+10] 1.97% -16.85% 23.96% 0.865 0.266 
[-5,-1] 1.19% -6.59% 16.52% 1.061 0.494 
[+1,+5] 0.66% -13.84% 7.62% 0.552 0.398 
[-10,-1] 1.74% -12.94% 18.91% 1.1137 0.265 
[+1,+10] -1.13% -19.18% 8.96% -0.791 0.697 
*Statistically significant at 10% level     
**Statistically significant at 5% level 
***Statistically significant at 1% level 
 
Table 8: Event study results for domestic and cross-border transactions. 
 
Acquirers’ cumulative abnormal returns are higher in cross-border M&A in all event periods 
and significantly different from zero for the [-5,+5] and [0] event windows. The wealth 
generation for the main event window [-5,+5]  is 3,21%, whereas it is 1,36% at announcement 
day. Furthermore, the difference between the two groups is statistically significant at the 10% 
level at announcement day [0] (p-value < 0.1= 0.073) and for the time window [-10,-1] (p-value 
< 0.1=0.062). The CAAR for the two groups during the main event window under study is also 
represented in graph 7 as the cross-border nature is proven to be an important determinant of 




Graph 7: CAAR for cros- border and domestic transactions. 
The results suggest that acquisitions pursued in a foreign country generate more value for the 
acquirer shareholders in the period under analysis. This outcome is particularly interesting 
considering the scenario in which those transactions have been undertaken. Cross borders deals 
have generated a positive investors reaction in a period where globalization has been 
undermined by all measures taken to counteract the pandemic such as social distances, 
lockdown, and travel restrictions. M&A deals negotiated overcoming not only the geographical 
borders but also restrictions, may have communicated to the market an even more intense 
proactive attitude and resiliency.  
 
4.2.3.5 Control Triggering Acquisition and Minority Interest Acquisitions  
 
The last factor discussed in the analysis is the stake acquired by the bidder company. Previous 
studies suggest that larger buyers’ returns are connected to larger equity interests by managers 
and employees (Bruner, 2004). The acquisition stake can be connected to some of the success 
factors discussed in the second chapter. When the transaction triggers a controlling interest 
(>50%), the synergistic potential will be higher. The bidder can effectively manage the acquired 
company toward the combination of the respective operations to create the additional value that 
would have not been created if the companies had operated independently. On the other hand, 
the more is the commitment, the higher will be the investment needed, the risk and complexity 
involved within the process.  
The main sample has been distinguished into two groups according to the sought percentage at 
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percent the company is included in group 1 (N=39), otherwise the observation is considered in 
group 2 (N=12). The computed CARs are represented in table 9. 
 














Acquisition stake >= 50% 
N=39 
[-5,+5] 1.58% -19.38% 21.38% 1.203 0.143 
[0] 0.84% -3.70% 11.04% 1.811* 0.159 
[-10,+10] 0.66% -33.87% 19.33% 0.397 0.403 
[-5,-1] 0.12% -13.67% 15.53% 0.145 0.748 
[+1,+5] 0.89% -14.02% 12.93% 1.058 0.209 
[-10,-1] -0.11% -21.95% 18.91% -0.136 0.987 
[+1,+10] -0.08% -12.88% 12.49% -0.114 0.730 
Acquisition stake <50% 
N=12    
 
 
[-5,+5] 0.41% -14.17% 26.22% 0.139 0.583 
[0] 0.19% -2.90% 6.91% 0.234 0.875 
[-10,+10] -1.26% -16.85% 23.96% -0.411 0.410 
[-5,-1] 0.49% -6.75% 16.52% 0.249 0.754 
[+1,+5] -0.27% -13.84% 12.46% -0.149 0.875 
[-10,-1] -0.74% -9.79% 13.08% -0.498 0.405 
[+1,+10] -0.67% -19.87% 11.97% -0.274 0.964 
*Statistically significant at 10% level 
**Statistically significant at 5% level 
***Statistically significant at 1% level 
  
Table 9: Event study results for controlling acquisitions and non-controlling acquisitions. 
 
Companies that have negotiated a controlling stake show higher average CARs for the event 
windows [-5,+5], [-10,+10] and for the event day [0]. The acquirers that sought to acquire a 
controlling stake, have generated a positive significant return of 0,84% at announcement day. 
However, the significance is not confirmed by the non-parametric test for the event day [0]. 
The abnormal returns generated are not significant for any of the other event periods under 
analysis. Furthermore, the comparison between the two subsamples does not reveal significant 
differences for any period under analysis. 
Considering the obtained outcome, the announcement of buying an acquisition stake that 
triggers control results a factor to be further explored. The low number of transactions under 
analysis may have influenced the results. Specifically, the few observations included in the 
second group may have contributed to the unclear returns pattern. As a consequence, this factor 




4.2.4 Conclusions   
 
The study has been conducted to explore whether the 51 M&A transactions in our sample, 
announced between February 2020 and August 2020 by Italian listed companies, have 
generated acquirers’ shareholder value creation. The analysis has considered the period around 
the announcement day as the time frame (short-term perspective), and the cumulative abnormal 
returns as a proxy for transactions’ profitability. Moreover, the success determinants have been 
explored. 
Small positive not statistically significant CARs have been recorded, thus the companies 
announcing M&A transactions during the Covid-19 pandemic have not been able to 
significantly increase their market value. As a consequence, the main hypothesis is not 
confirmed by our results. However, the recording of small positive non-significant abnormal 
returns is a common outcome in event studies related to the acquirers’ shareholders value 
creation around M&A announcement (e.g. Franks et al., 1991; Shleifer and Vishny, 1994; 
Schwert, 1996; Agrawal and Jaffe, 2000; Billett et al.; 2003). Moreover, in exploring M&A 
profitability, not only statistical significance should be proven but also materiality (Bruner, 
2004). No negative CARs have been registered for the main event window considered [-5,+5] 
both for the overall sample and for most of the subsamples explored. The cumulative abnormal 
returns reported ranges from 1 to 3 percent, not really high but still positive. As the analysis 
considers a time frame of few days, even abnormal returns as low as 1 or 2 percent are enough 
to cause concerns (Bruner, 2004).  In light of these considerations, the analysis has revealed 
that on average the companies in our sample that have announced a transaction during the 
Covid-19 pandemic crises have conserved value, rather than destroyed or created it. The value 
conservation conclusion implies that investors have obtained at least their required returns, thus 
they have been compensated for the additional risk taken within the transaction. 
Moreover, among the sample higher and lower levels of value creation have been observed, 
suggesting that there are factors within the process that materially influence M&A profitability. 
The analysis made by dividing the main sample into subsamples has been conducted to explore 
the extent to which those factors contribute to determining success among the transactions 
under study. While the relative size of the target and the previous bidder experience have not 
generated significant greater value for the acquirers’ shareholders, engaging in cross-border 
transactions and seeking to acquire a controlling stake have contributed to extra value 
generation for the acquirer investors. Especially undertaking transactions, overcoming the 
national borders has led to earning significant positive cumulative abnormal returns of 3,21% 
in the 11 days event window [-5,+5] and 1,36% at announcement day [0].   
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It has to be stressed that the results obtained through the event study contribute to give insights 
about the value creation implication of M&A activity during downturns. However, results apply 
specifically to the M&A activity on the Italian scenario during the first period characterized by 
the Covid-19 crisis. The pandemic has hit countries to a different extent, leading to distinct 
economic implications, thus diverse effects on the M&A market. As a consequence, universal 
conclusions cannot be drawn from the study in connection to the regional focus (Italy), the 
relatively low number of observations, and the short time frame.  
Further analysis may be conducted including transactions negotiated by acquirers from 
different countries. Moreover, more observations would lead to more precise estimates. M&A 
performance could also be analyzed by combining stock-market and accounting based methods 
that are amply suggested by the critics (e.g. Lubatkin, 1983; King et al., 2004). Finally, a long-
term perspective should be included to see if results obtained considering a short period around 
announcement are supported.  
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4.3 Covid-19 Impact on Financials and M&A Activity  
 
The pandemic crisis has hit the entire economy with different intensity among the various 
industries but pushing every company to face an unprecedented scenario. The impact on the 
business activities has been tough.  In Italy an Istat analysis on 90.000 companies has revealed 
that 4 out of 10 firms have registered a decrease in revenues by 50% between March and April 
2020. Moreover, half of the companies under study have forecasted a liquidity shortage and 
42,6% have required new loans (Istat, 2020).  
In our sample the revenue change presents a high variation among the firms, the registered 
change shifts from a revenue increase by +80% to a decrease by -64%. 73% of the firms have 
reported a negative impact on revenues and for 71% of them it has overcome -10%. However, 
also a positive increase has been observed:  27% of the companies have registered a positive 
revenue change despite the situation (see graph 8). The data reflects how different companies 
in different sectors have been hit with a different intensity but show how the majority of them 
have overseen a negative impact. 
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The second research question wants to explore if companies more active in the M&A market 
are those less affected by the crisis, thus more financially strong. Revenues and Ebitda have 
been collected as performance indicators to operationalize the impact of the Covid-19 crisis on 
company financials. Revenues represent the income generated by the normal business without 
taking into consideration any cost. It is the top line of the P&L from which operative and non-
operative expenses are deducted to determine net income. On the other hand, Ebitda indicates 
the company’s ability to generate value from its core business, without taking into consideration 
amortization, depreciation and taxes but only operating costs. The interest in considering both 
measures is to see if results obtained focusing on one performance indicator are supported by 
the other. 
A statistical approach is taken to answer the second research question. The analysis wants to 
assess whether there is a positive relationship between the Revenue % change (H1 2019- H1 
2020) and the propensity of making a deal, measured by the number of transactions performed. 
The same study is done considering the Ebitda % change. A positive relationship is expected 
in both cases: companies less affected by Covid-19, thus more financially strong, are more 
prone to take the costs and risks of undertaking an M&A transaction. 
Following this direction, the analysis has moved formulating two main hypotheses that have 
been further segmented (a and b) to reflect the two available information that stands for the 
companies’ economic performance (Revenues and Ebitda): 
 
H1a: Companies that have undertaken at least an M&A transaction in the period under analysis 
have been less financially impacted by Covid-19 crises, thus were more financially strong 
(measured as Revenues % change) than firms that have not performed any deal.  
H1b: Companies that have undertaken at least an M&A transaction in the period under analysis 
have been less financially impacted by Covid-19 crises, thus were more financially strong 
(measured as Ebitda % change) than firms that have not performed any deal.  
 
H2a: Among the companies that performed at least one transaction a positive correlation is 
expected between the Revenue % Change and the propensity of making a deal.  
H2b: Among the companies that performed at least one transaction a positive correlation is 
expected between the Ebitda % Change and the propensity of making a deal.  
 
In the following part, after the specification of the sample, the methodology used is described 
followed by the obtained results and the related discussion.  
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4.3.1 Sample  
 
From the initial 166 companies, 80 have been excluded from the analysis as the financial 
statements for the first semester of 2020 were not available at the time of the database creation. 
Therefore, the final sample size totaled at 86 companies. Of these, 32 have performed at least 
one transaction (Min=1 Max=4) between February 2020 and August 2020, while the remaining 
54 companies did not perform any M&A deal.  
It has to be stressed that for testing the hypothesis connected to the Ebitda % change, the final 
sample amounted to 82 companies, four companies have been excluded.  One of them has been 
taken out from the sample as an outlier. It has overseen an Ebitda % change of 4057%, a 
variation that has not significance treated as percentage and that would cause problems in our 
study. The other three companies have been excluded for the lack of Ebitda disclosure in the 
latest documents publicly available. 
 
4.3.2 Methodology  
 
The study has been conducted by exploring the relationship between three different variables.  
The first one is the propensity of making a deal which has been operationalized as the number 
of transactions performed between February 2020 and August 2020. A low number of 
transactions stands for a low propensity, while a high number of transactions stands for a high 
propensity of making a deal. Companies that have performed at least a deal have been 
considered active companies. The maximum number of transactions executed has been 4 and 
the minimum 1, thus this variable is intended as a scale from 1 to 4 that measures the degree of 
attitude toward M&A. 
The second variable is the Revenue % change between H1 2019 and H1 2020. It operationalizes 
the Covid-19 impact on companies’ financials. It has been calculated by computing the percent 
change variation between revenues in the first semester of 2019 and the same line in 2020 
financial statements.  
Formula: 
Revenue % change= (Revenues H1 2020/Revenues H1 2019) -1 
 
Finally, the Ebitda % change is taken into consideration as a second indicator of the pandemic 





Ebitda % Change= (Ebitda H1 2020/Ebitda H1 2019) -1 
 
Propensity of making a deal Revenues % change Ebitda % change 
        
Mean 0,57 Mean -12,37% Mean -25,91% 
Median 0 Median -15,3% Median -24,5% 
Sample variance 0,79 Sample variance 0,07 Sample variance 0,19 
Kurtosis 2,63 Kurtosis 3,30 Kurtosis 0,98 
Skewness 1,69 Skewness 1,28 Skewness -0,67 
Range 4 Range 1,43 Range 2,29 
Minimum 0 Minimum -63,61% Minimum -168,69% 
Maximum 4 Maximum 79,89% Maximum 60,32% 
Count 86 Count 86 Count 82 
 
Table 10: Variables Descriptive Statistics 
After the variable’s definition, their distribution has been checked looking for normality to 
define if a parametric or non-parametric measure should have been applied.  
The Z scores for skewness and kurtosis have been computed by dividing their raw score by its 
standard error for all variables.  
 
Formulas: 





The variables are not normally distributed as their Z scores do not fall within the +/-1.96 range 
for a small sample <100 observations.  
Propensity of making a deal and Revenue % change are leptokurtic and positively skewed, 
Ebitda % change is negatively skewed. As a consequence, non-parametric tests have to be 
performed. The variables distributions are represented in the graphs below. 
Variables Zskewness Zkurtosis
Propensity of making a deal 6,69 5,85
Revenues % Change 4,655 5,18
Ebitda % Change -2,56 1,882
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Graph 9: Propensity of making a deal distribution 
 
Graph 10: Revenues % change distribution 
 
Graph 11: Ebitda % change distribution 
Firstly, Spearman correlation, a non-parametric measure, has been computed to explore the 
relationship among the variables under analysis. A positive correlation is expected between the 
propensity of making a deal and the Revenues % change and Ebitda % change that 
operationalize the crisis impact on companies’ financials. 
Secondly, another test has been performed to further explore the relationship among the 
variables. The main sample has been divided in two subsamples. Group 1 is composed by firms 
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transaction have been coded as group 2. This classification has been maintained for both H1a 
and H1b. A nonparametric Mann Whitney U test has been performed to analyze if the difference 
in Revenues % change and Ebitda % change among the two groups was statistically significant, 
thus statistically different from 0.  Finally, Spearman correlation has been computed also to test 
H2a and H2b focusing on the subsample of companies that have made at least one deal (Group 
2). 
 
4.3.3 Results  
 
H1a: Spemann correlation has been measured to explore the relationship between the 
propensity of making a deal and the Revenues % change. As expected, we found a significant 
and positive correlation between the two variables R =.31, p< .005.  
The obtained result supports our hypothesis, companies that have performed more transactions 
are those whose revenues have been less negatively impacted by the crisis. 
However, to further explore the positive relationship, the two subsamples (yes transaction and 
no transactions) have been taken into consideration. Companies that performed transactions N= 
32 (Mdn= -.08, IQR=.26) had a lower loss in revenues than companies that did not perform any 
deal N= 54 (Mdn= -.19, IQR=.24). In graph 12 the Revenues % change distribution is 
represented for each group. It can be noticed graphically how companies that have performed 
at least one transaction have recorded a milder revenues variation than group 1. A Mann Whiney 
U test has indicated that the difference in the revenue variable between the two groups was 
statistically significant. Companies that have performed at least one transaction had 
significantly lower losses in delta revenues than companies that did not perform any deal 
(U=1170,50, p=.006, z=2.74, r=.30).  
 
 









Revenue % change Distribution by groups
Group 1- No Transaction Group 2- Yes Transaction
H2a 
Group 1 Group 2 
No deal Yes deal 
Revenues % change 
Mean -119% Mean -0,10% 
Median -19,0% Median -8,00% 
Min -64,0% Min -36,0% 
Max 25,0% Max 80,0% 
Range 0,89 Range 1,16 
IQR 0,24 IQR 0,26 
Obs 54 Obs 32 
Table 11: Descriptive statistics H2a  
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In light of the results obtained, H1a is accepted. It can be concluded that companies that have 
undertaken at least one M&A transaction in the period under analysis have been less financially 
impacted by the Covid-19 crises, thus were more financially strong than firms that have not 
performed any deal.  
 
The same methodology is applied considering Ebitda as an indicator of the company 
performance, expecting the same conclusions.   
 
H1b: Spearman correlation between the propensity of making a deal and Ebitda % change is 
positive but not statistically significant considering a confidence interval of 95%; R=.19, p >.05 
(=.12). Thus, the outcome does not meet the expectations and does not support our hypothesis. 
Further analyzing the two subsamples (yes transaction and no transaction), the difference in the 
Ebitda variation among the groups in this case is not straightforward (see graph 13). Companies 
that have performed at least one transaction, have also reported a really negative change in 
Ebitda, observable on the left tail of the distribution. However, the outcome obtained testing 
the correlation among the propensity of making a deal and the Ebitda variable, already revised 
the expectation for the outcome connected to the subsamples. A Mann Whitney U test has been 
performed and among the two groups (yes deals N=31, mdn= -.12, IQR=.39; no deal N=51, 
mdn=-.29, IQR=.62) no statistically significant difference has been found (U=950,00, p> .05 
=.127, z=1.53, r=.17).  
 
 
                Graph 13: Ebitda % change distribution 
Therefore, results do not support H2b. Considering Ebitda as a performance indicator, it cannot 









-1,7--1,6 -0,7--0,6 -0,2--0,1 0,3-0,4
Ebitda % change distribution by group 
Group 1- No Transaction Group 2- Yes Transaction
H2b 
Group 1 Group 2 
No deal  Yes deal  
Ebitda % change  
Mean  -30,14% Mean  -18,85% 
Median -29,00% Median -12,00% 
Min  -135% Min  -169% 
Max 49,00% Max 60% 
Range 1,84 Range 2,29 
IQR 0,62 IQR 0,39 
Obs 51 Obs 31 
Table 12: Descriptive statistics H2b  
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under analysis have been less financially impacted by Covid-19, thus were more financially 
strong than firms that have not performed any deal. 
 
H2a: The correlation between the propensity of making a deal and the Revenue % change has 
been computed among companies that have performed at least one transaction (Group 2). The 
correlation is positive but not statistically significant R= 0.21, p> 0.05 (=0.14). Therefore, H2a 
is rejected. 
 
H2b: In line with the results obtained for H2a, the Spearman correlation between the propensity 
of making a deal and Ebitda variation is positive but not statistically significant R=0.3, p>0,05 
(=0.21). The results do not support H2b. 
 
4.3.4 Discussion and Conclusions 
 
Revenues and Ebitda % changes between H1 2019 and H1 2020 have been chosen as 
performance indicators to represent the Covid-19 crisis impact on the companies’ financials. 
The relationships between those variables and the propensity of making an M&A transaction 
has been explored, with the expectation that companies undertaking more deals have been those 
less financially impacted by the crisis. The belief of obtaining the same results for both analyses 
lies in the strict connection that is present among the two variables. Both performance indicators 
are linked to the income statement and to the ability of a company to gain market share and sell 
its goods/services in the market. However, Ebitda by excluding operating costs is also impacted 
by how efficiently a company can produce its products/services. The more a company will be 
efficient, the lower will be its operating expenses and higher will be the Ebitda, all things being 
equal. 
On one hand, the positive and significant correlation between the propensity of making a deal 
and Covid-19 impact on Revenues among the companies under study suggests that those that 
have undertaken M&A transactions have seen their financials less impacted by the crisis. As 
expected, the relationship between stronger financials and the engagement in a complex and 
costly transaction as M&A is positive. This relationship is confirmed also by looking at the 
Revenues % change among the companies that performed a transaction and firms that did not. 
This suggests that those that engaged in a transaction have suffered less the effect of the crisis, 
thus a stronger company is more prone to undertake an M&A deal. However, when we looked 
at the revenues variable among the companies that have performed at least one transaction the 
correlation is not confirmed. Among this group the revenue variable is not significatively 
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connected to the propensity of making a deal, thus companies have performed M&A 
transactions independently from the intensity of the crisis impact on revenues. Considering the 
second result together with that obtained testing H1a, it appears that among companies that 
performed and those that did not perform a deal a different impact of financials in the propensity 
of making a deal can be noticed, when considering revenues as a performance indicator. But if 
the focus moves only on companies that have undertaken at least one M&A transaction, it is 
not confirmed that firms that have performed more transactions have been less impacted by the 
Covid-19 crisis.  
On the other hand, the discussed results are not supported by looking at the Ebitda % change. 
H1b is rejected as the positive correlation between the propensity of making a deal and the 
Ebitda variable is not statistically significant, in line with this result also H2b is not confirmed. 
This outcome may be explained by the fact that Ebitda is connected also to the costs a company 
faces concerning its core business, thus reflecting also the specific cost policy adopted and the 
level of efficiency, as mentioned. Moreover, the cost structure differs among companies also in 
relation to the belonging sector and our analysis takes into consideration firms independently 
from the sector in which they operate. As a consequence, comparing the Ebitda % change 
among different sectors may lose significance.  
Despite the different results obtained, in our opinion revenues are a better indicator of Covid-
19 impact on financials in our study and in connection to our database.  It is the first line item 
of the P&L impacted and less affected by other elements under the company control than 
Ebitda. Ebitda is the result of a reclassification of the income statement performed by the 
company, thus more subject to potential misstatement, making revenues a raw and more 
transparent data. Moreover, one of the main effects of the Covid-19 pandemic has been the 
decrease in customer demand, having the crisis highly impacted firms’ and households’ income, 
directly connected to revenues rather than Ebitda.  
As a consequence, we conclude that companies that have performed an M&A deal in the period 
under analysis (February 2020- August 2019) have seen their revenues less impacted by the 
pandemic crises. But, among the companies that performed at least one transaction (Min=1, 
Max=4 transaction performed) the lower degree of intensity of the Covid-19 impact on sales 
was not related to a higher propensity of making a deal. It cannot be said that among companies 
that performed at least one transaction, those that have seen their revenues less impacted have 
made more deals. 
The results obtained in this study could be tested using a more sophisticated statistical 
regression that would enable to drown conclusions about the causal effect relationship between 
the three variables. However, the dataset should be enriched both in terms observations and 
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variables that explain the propensity of making an M&A deal. Moreover, it has to be stressed 
that both the Revenue % change and the Ebitda % change, here used to operationalize the effect 
of the pandemic crisis on financials, are impacted by other factors rather than the crisis itself, 
thus other variables should be included to control for these elements.  
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4.4 M&A Activity among Sectors During Covid-19 
 
The third research question wants to explore in which sectors most transactions have occurred. 
This is interesting also in connection to the high variability of revenues percent change 
variations registered among the companies under study.  
The main sample composed of 166 companies is utilized, and the research is done through a 
Pivot table that synthesizes the data among the sample. 51 companies (30,09% of the sample) 
have incurred at least one transaction, for a total of 80 transactions closed or announced. Borsa 
Italiana categorizes public companies into sixteen Super Sectors that are represented in graph 
14 on the vertical axis. The companies’ sectors help to understand how the crisis has affected 
businesses in a different way in connection to their cyclicality (Pearce and Steven, 2005). 
Expectations of a severe impact are overseen for more cyclical sectors whose business evolution 
is connected to macroeconomic or systematic changes of the economy. These sectors follow 
the economic cycle and include customer products that are bought more during good economic 
periods. Examples are the automotive, real estate, travel, household appliances sectors. 
Whereas, non-cyclical sectors are unrelated to the economic cycle. These continue to operate 
as customers are less sensitive to the product/service price they offer. As a consequence, in 
these sectors demand continues, and companies tend to outperform the market when economy 
growth slows. Healthcare, pharmaceutical, public services, food sectors are included in this 
group.  
In connection to the positive and statistically significant relationship between the impact of 
Covid-19 on financials and the propensity of making a deal, the M&A activity is expected to 
be higher for sectors belonging to the non-cyclical group.  
Coming back to our sample, the M&A activity registered in the most relevant sectors is 




Graph 14: Transactions volume by Super Sector 
Following Borsa Italiana categorization, the sector where more transactions have been 
performed between February 2020 and August 2020 has been Industrial Product and Services. 
The transactions account for 21,4% of the deal activity, taking into consideration the entire 
sample. This result is in line with the conclusion drawn by the Pitchbook analysis on European 
transactions in H1 2020. The analysis stresses how the deal volume and value in the B2B space 
showed resilience in the first half of the year (Pitchbook, 2020). The reason is that B2B 
companies’ products and services allow other firms to maintain flexibility and face the 
challenges of expanding into new markets, improving R&D and promoting cost efficiency.  
Moreover, this kind of companies are less connected to a specific territory or brand, this 
constitutes a strength in the environment defined by the crisis. However, by looking at the 
company specific industry a defined acquisition pattern cannot be found.  
Another sector characterized by great deal activity in the period under observation has been the 
Public Services, mainly constituted by the companies operating in the power and utility sectors. 
Challenges have been faced by these players in connection to the industrial power demand 
decrease and the rise of customer defaults, that impacted their financials (Booth et al., 2020). 
In Italy, the energy demand in March has been lower by 17% compared to the same month of 
2019 (Bruegel Datasets, 2020). Despite the challenges that also this industry has faced, 
companies belonging to the power and utility sector are among those that have thought 
strategically in order to adapt to the new context. This trend is reflected in our analysis where 
16,1% of the transactions have occurred among the companies operating in the power and utility 
sectors. 

















Transactions volume by Super Sector
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Telecommunication and Technology sectors follow with 8 deals each, accounting for 10,8% of 
the transactions. Focusing on the Technology sector another European trend is confirmed in the 
Italian scenario. Acquisitions in this class have occurred among companies operating in the 
software sector. Widening the lens at the European level, the B2B enterprise software space has 
registered in 2020 its second best-half deal value over the last decade (Pitchbook, 2020). On 
one hand, this is connected to the more and more frequent trend of investments in cloud systems, 
cybersecurity, e-commerce subsectors that has started before the pandemic outbreak. On the 
other, the new environment is undoubtedly pushing an acceleration toward automation and 
digitalization that makes companies in the software sector in a better position than others, 
having also less impact on their financials.  
The Healthcare and Pharmaceutical sector had and is having a central role since the Covid-19 
outbreak. Investments and revenues in this area haven’t stopped and projections call for a 
revenues loss by around 4% that is sustained compared to the double-digit losses in other sectors 
(Unicredit, 2020). Despite the 2020 forecast, the sector is expected to grow by 4,7% in 2021 
(Istat, 2020). This situation, coupled with investors’ enthusiasm, has pushed companies to 
pursue their industrial plan and growth strategy. Moreover, the crisis has also shown the 
bottleneck and inefficiencies of this industry in the Italian scenario. Personnel shortages, lack 
of digitalization, and procedures complexities have pushed even more the need for strategic 
ways to grow, overcoming these problems. Between February and August 2020, the M&A 
activity in these sectors has not stopped, five transactions have been registered among the 8 
companies in the sample representing this sector. At the European level, the M&A activity in 
the Healthcare and Pharmaceutical sector has registered its best performance in the first half of 
2020 over decades. 
Where sectors have been particularly active and resilient to the pandemic crisis, some for 
structural characteristics, others for being fundamental in this unprecedented scenario; some 
others have suffered more the challenges, and this is reflected also in the poor propensity for 
engaging in M&A transactions. Among the less-active super sectors in our analysis, we find 
Travel, Real Estate, Raw Materials, and Chemistry.  
Real Estate and Travel have been the sectors among the most hit by the pandemic. The measures 
imposed by the national governments, among which lockdown, social distancing, and travel 
restrictions, had a major impact on their activity. The Real-Estate projection before the crisis 
was characterized by an expansionary phase with prices increase and great demand level, the 
situation has changed after Covid-19 in both residential and commercial sectors (PWC, 2020). 
The long-term expectation in the residential sector sees a contraction connected to the effect 
that the crisis will have on the families ‘income. The commercial and industrial assets on the 
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other hand are expected to show less decline in connection to the need for more space, however 
the expansion of e-commerce will have an impact on the retail sector. The Travel sector other 
than being impacted by the limitations mentioned has been highly undermined by the 
consequences of the touristic flow drop. The tourism economy will oversee in 2020 a decrease 
of 60% internationally, according to the OECD estimation. Focusing on Italy the travel and 
tourism are central for the economy, accounting for 5% of the Italian GDP and related to over 
6% of the Italian employment (Banca d’Italia, 2019).  
The hard impact of the crisis on the Real Estate and Travel sectors reflects the poor deal activity 
among the listed Italian companies. Only 2 deals have been registered among the sample 
accounting for only 2% of all transactions.  
For what concerns the Raw Material and Chemistry sectors, the companies in the sample were 
not sufficient to make relevant conclusions about their M&A activity. 
The expectations related to the cyclicality of the sectors have been confirmed. In the scenario 
set by the Covid-19 crisis, the sectors where less deal activity has occurred have been those 
offering products/services whose demand falls within the economy. On the other hand, 
inorganic expansion has been registered among non-cyclical sectors and those that most fit in 
the scenario shaped by the crisis. Public services, Industrial products and services, Technology 
and Healthcare and Pharmaceutical have been the more active sectors. Nonetheless, it has to be 
stressed that the sample characteristics may have influenced the result, a more complete 
analysis should be performed including also private companies that would enable a more 
precise by sector analysis.  
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4.5 M&A Activity Motives During Covid-19 Pandemic 
 
The fourth research question wants to explore the motives that have moved companies to 
perform M&A transactions and see whether a rational prevails among the sample. The study 
has been conducted considering the companies that have performed a deal (N=51) among the 
main database of 166 firms and the related 80 transactions closed or announced. 
The main M&A motives have been discussed in the first chapter of the work. In the database 
construction the main strategic rationale of the deal has been included for each company 
performing a transaction. Those were present in the firms’ websites in the documentation 
disclosed in the price sensitive communications section.   
In order to operationalize the analysis, the motives disclosed by the companies have been 
categorized maintaining the rationale seen in the first chapter. As mentioned, the two main 
motives are growth and synergies, those have been further segmented to better reflect the 
rationale of the specific deal. The growth strategies related to a specific rationale and connected 
to an M&A deal have been distinguished using the Ansoff matrix as a starting point (Asnoff, 
1957). This business tool has been used over the years to represent the growth possibilities as 
a 2 x 2 matrix, where the determinants of the resulting actions are the product (new/existing) 
and the market (new/ existing), giving rise to 4 different growth strategies (Figure 3). The author 
considers the strategies as a district path to follow toward future growth (Asnoff, 1957). 
However, in this context those possibilities are instrumental for representing in a systematic 
way the M&A activity rationale, thus the motivations are not mutually exclusive. This scheme 
has been applied to the M&A activity by considering the M&A transaction as the means to 
overcome a particular growth opportunity, so connected to the deal rationale.  
 
Figure 3: Ansoff Matrix 
 
Following this scheme, the motives related to growth are: 
- Penetration in an existing market: This motive broadly involves the penetration in both 
an existing geographical and product/service market. Companies that have stated that 
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the rationale of the acquisition was driven by the need to strengthen their position in a 
market where they were already operating have been connected to this motivation.  
- Entrance in a new market:  The market includes both product/service and geographic 
market, also in this circumstance. The transactions aimed at geographic expansion, 
internationalization, or the entrance into a new business activity fall in this category.  
- Product Development: This motive includes those rationales connected to the 
enhancement of the product characteristics that lead to an offer increase.   
- Diversification: This motive has been used when present in the companies’ documents 
as the acquisition strategic rationale. 
The second motive discussed in chapter 1 relates to synergies. It is hard to fully understand the 
nature of the synergies from the information disclosed by the companies; hence the motive 
synergies includes both operative and financial synergies discussed previously in major details. 
The pursuit of this rationale has been connected to companies that have specifically stated in 
their documents to follow this motive. 
The last motive included is the increase in the control share of the acquirer over the target, this 
situation reflects the cases in which an equity participation was already present and the bidder 
aimed at increasing its position (Control).  
A transaction can be pushed by a combination of motives, hence the companies in our sample 
can be motivated by one or more of the above-mentioned rationales. These have been connected 
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The analysis, synthesized in graph 15, has shown how the most common motivations relate to 
growth. As stated in the literature review M&A deals can be seen as tools for implementing 
growth strategies and this is proven to move transactions’ activity also empirically, taking into 
consideration our sample. The most cited rationale among the 54 companies that have 
accomplished an M&A transaction has been the penetration in existing markets (46%). 
According to this result, companies are more prone to grow by moving toward what is closer 
to the company dimensions. This is in line with the view that sees sustainable and profitable 
growth as the result of pushing out the boundaries of the core business into adjacent spaces 
(Zook and Allen, 2003). This trend may be also connected to the critical period in which the 
companies in the sample were operating while performing a deal. In a distressed situation like 
the pandemic crisis scenario, moving toward the company “comfort zone” is understandable. 
The environment is itself risky and forces companies to face challenges, undertaking riskier 
M&A transactions could undermine the deal’s success and business resilience. 
Moreover, also the exploration of new markets and product development have been a frequent 
motivation, accounting together for 28% of the registered motives. The strategies connected to 
these motives maintain again a connection with the core business. The possibility to gain from 
synergies concur to explain 17% of the deals, while diversification is the least motive registered. 
It has to be stressed that using disclosed information by public companies is a benefit for data 
availability, but the analysis is highly biased by the subjectivity and detail of the disclosed 
information. As a consequence, some motives discussed in the first chapter, such as those 
connected to the management self-interest, are not present.  
The analysis conclusions give insights about deal rationale during downturns, but those have to 
be referred to the specific sample. Additional analysis should be performed using more 




Despite the broad literature on M&A, little attention has been directed to the external forces 
that contribute to defining deal activity. Specifically, scant research has treated how M&A 
activity is impacted by downturns. This work has been conducted with the aim of filling this 
gap, increasing the understanding around the role and the value creation implications of M&A 
negotiated in critical business environments, from the perspective of the acquiring company. 
To do so, firstly an overview of M&A transactions has been given to set the work foundations. 
The process has been described, clarifying the embedded complexity that characterizes those 
transactions. Moreover, the main motivations that push acquirers to perform a deal have been 
explored. It has been shown how among different motivations growth and synergies 
exploitation prevail. 
Then the focus has moved to the value creation potential of M&A transactions. Various 
business fields have contributed to give insights about M&A performance and what defines 
deals’ success. The various perspectives and methods used to measure performance had the 
consequence of failing to provide an integrated framework. Combining studies outcomes 
connected to acquirers’ value creation, it appears clear how performance exploration has led to 
ambiguous results. Bidders’ abnormal returns range from positive to negative, not always 
confirmed by statistical significance. However, this results discrepancy suggests that some 
success determinants contribute to defining different levels of performance. The main success 
factors have been explored, combining the perspective of strategic management, finance, and 
organizational behavior fields. 
Although the performance determinants have been delineated considering M&A as a business 
specific event, deal activity is also impacted by external environment conditions. As a 
consequence, the work has pursued exploring the relationship between M&A and the external 
environment. Deal activity is boosted by good economic conditions, whereas it tends to be 
weaker during recessions. When GDP, stock market, interest rate, aggregate demand are 
negatively impacted by a shock, the deal volume and value tend to decrease. 
The effect that external factors have on deal activity has brought us to the core of the work, 
analyzing the general role of M&A and its value creation implication when the external 
conditions that thrive deal activity fail to occur. 
The role of M&A in distressed scenarios is connected to the possible strategies a company can 
deploy to counteract hard times. Firms that see opportunities for investments, expansion, and 
innovation despite the critical external conditions can use M&A as a tool to implement their 
strategic objectives and demonstrate a proactive attitude toward adverse scenarios. Moreover, 
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acquisitions can be a company’s means to implement the changes to quickly adapt to the 
scenario defended by a crisis. When economic or technology shocks occur, firms can reorganize 
leveraging on mergers and acquisitions.  As a crisis does not affect all companies equally, firms 
that have the highest value creation potential are characterized by a strong balance sheet and 
good recent economic performance. Moreover, risk tolerance and previous deal experience 
contribute to deal success. 
It has been discussed how value creation potential does not cease to exist as also new 
opportunities arise from downturns. Acquirers can benefit from lower valuation multiples and 
low cost of capital. Furthermore, the chance to select the best fit tends to increase as companies 
that were not available for sale may become potential targets, for the negative effect that the 
crisis has on their business. However, the M&A market is not immune to adverse external 
conditions. Uncertainty increases the complexity of some phases of the business process. 
Firstly, target valuation becomes harder when projections are difficult to forecast, with the 
ultimate effect on uncertainty about the proper premium to apply. Secondly, the post-
acquisition phase is challenged by the uncertain situation. Customer focus, employee retention, 
communication, and integration speed have been described as the most critical elements to deal 
with in bringing together two businesses during downturns. 
 
The recent Covid-19 outbreak and its effect on the global economy have stressed more than 
ever the unpredictability of downturns and the difficulties of facing periods of high uncertainty. 
So far, it has had a negative influence on production, investment, and consumption, with the 
ultimate negative effect on national GDP, customer demand, and employment. In such 
scenarios, the M&A activity and its value creation implications have been tested. A sample of 
Italian listed companies has been taken into consideration for our study, screening the deal 
activity occurred between February and August 2020. Four different aspects of M&A activity 
during the pandemic have been explored. 
Firstly, the value creation effect of M&A announced during the Covid-19 crisis has been 
analyzed.  Results showed no statistically significant small positive cumulative abnormal 
returns to acquiring shareholders. These results firstly appeared in contrast to our hypothesis, 
according to which transactions were expected to be value creating for the positive message of 
resiliency communicated to the market. However, this outcome has been often registered in 
empirical work. Moreover, other than statistical significance, materiality has to be considered 
in interpreting economic results. As a consequence, the registered positive CARs even if not 
statistically significant suggest that transactions announced during the pandemic have 
conserved value for the acquiring company shareholders, rather than created or destroyed it. 
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Beyond the overall sample results, analyzing data with a more individual approach showed how 
some companies have registered higher abnormal returns than others around the announcement. 
Among the success factors taken into consideration to test this differential, making a cross 
border deals and the acquisition of a controlling stake have been proven to be important value 
creation determinants. 
The second analysis has demonstrated the relevance of financial strength as a determinant of 
deal activity during critical times. A positive significant correlation has been found between the 
propensity of making a deal and the revenues variation between the first semester of 2019 and 
the first semester of 2020. This result suggests that companies that have performed transactions 
during the pandemic crisis are those that have seen their revenues less impacted, thus were more 
financially strong. 
The third analysis explored the M&A activity concentration, taking a wider perspective and 
focusing on the business sectors. As expected, the most resilient companies in the M&A market 
have been those belonging to the sectors less affected by the general economic conditions and 
those included in the non-cyclical sectors. Industrial products and services, public services, 
telecommunication and technology companies have negotiated more deals. Transactions have 
been registered also for those sectors that have led the change defined by the pandemic. 
Healthcare and pharmaceuticals had and are having a central role in the Covid-19 scenario; thus 
M&A deals have resulted to be important tools for implementing the growth strategy needed to 
face the present conditions. Whereas, sectors more impacted by the crisis and whose demand 
is more related to the economy have struggled to opt for inorganic growth options. Travel and 
real estate have been registered among the less active sectors mirroring the hard impact of the 
pandemic on their business. 
The fourth and last study focused on the motivations that have pushed companies to pursue 
deals. Results show that firms that have engaged in transactions during these hard times have 
opted for inorganic growth but maintaining a relationship with the core business. Most 
transactions have been performed to either strengthen the market position or improve the 
existing product/service. These results support the view that companies seeking value creation 
through external growth should move from the core business through adjacencies. 
 
Overall these results give a new insight into M&A activity during downturns adding to this 
literature the short-term effect of the Covid-19 pandemic on the deal market. Transactions have 
proven to be value conserving for the acquirer shareholders. However, cross-border 
negotiations and seeking a majority stake have generated on average greater value for the 
acquiring firm. The leading actors of the M&A activity have been companies more financially 
 107 
strong and belonging to sectors less affected by the pandemic. Among the active firms, the main 
motivation for pursuing M&A deals during the pandemic has been growth, observing a pattern 
that sees acquirers pursuing transactions maintaining a connection with the core business. 
To conclude, it is important to note that these results are specific to the scenario considered in 
the analysis. Covid-19 has hit countries to a different extent, and the specific economic scenario 
set by the crisis should be taken into consideration when the impact on the M&A activity is 
analyzed. As a consequence, conclusions might not be universally applicable to M&A activity 
during critical times. Nevertheless, future studies could be conducted considering data from 
different countries or geographical areas. This would allow us to explore deal activity dynamics 
in varied crisis scenarios, thus coming to more general conclusions. It would be also important 
to include more observations in the sample to increase the precision of the estimates. Moreover, 
the study has not considered private companies that constitute a great portion of the industrial 
network, especially in Italy, these should be included to obtain a more accurate picture of a 
country’s M&A activity. Value creation could be explored combining different approaches, 
both stock and accounting methods, including also a long-term perspective other than a short-
term view. This approach would enable us to integrate different methodologies and time 
perspectives as the literature suggests. Finally, future literature and empirics should consider 
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